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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENT AND RELATED SERVICES,
UNDER THE EHA: DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
LEFT UNANSWERED IN ILLINOIS-
IN RE CLAUDIA K.
The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA or "the Act")' creates an
entitlement grant program2 under which federal funds are provided to assist
states in establishing, expanding, and improving special education programs
for handicapped children.' A state's voluntary acceptance of EHA funding4
1. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The purpose of the Act was:
to assure that all handicapped children have available to them, within the time
period specified . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that
the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected,
to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children,
and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1981). The specific congressional findings which led to the EHA's
enactment were incorporated under § 1400(b). Congress concluded that inadequate financial
resources precluded state and local educational agencies from fulfilling their responsibility to
the more than eight million handicapped children in the United States. Accordingly, in order
to ensure equal protection of the law, Congress determined that the national interest compelled
the federal government to assist state and local efforts in meeting the special educational needs
of the handicapped. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the Act's implementation, see
Colley, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis,
10 J.L. & EDuc. 137 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Colley]; Krass, The Right to Public Education
for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016; Special
Section: Education for the Handicapped, 14 CONN. L. REv. 471 (1982); Note, The Education
of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 110 (1976).
2. The entitlements and allocations are established through a formula designed to deter-
mine the maximum state entitlement. Under the Act, "the maximum amount of the grant to
which a State is entitled . . . for any fiscal year [is] equal to the number of handicapped
children aged three to twenty-one, inclusive, in such State who are receiving special education
and related services" multiplied by a certain percent, ranging from 5 to 40, of the national
average pupil expenditure in public elementary and secondary schools for the fiscal years from
1978 to 1982. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(l)(B)(i)-(v) (1976).
3. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 602(a)(1), 95 Stat. 483
(1981), authorized the appropriation of $969,850,000 for fiscal year 1982, and $1,017,900 for
each of the fiscal years 1983 and 1984, to fund EHA programs.
4. A state's choice not to participate in acquisition of federal funds under the EHA has
been held to be a decision within the state's power and not subject to judicial scrutiny. See
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 394 (D.N.M.
1980) (raising the issue of whether the state's election not to participate in the grant program
violates the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.2d
847 (10th Cir. 1982). Prior to Pub. L. No. 94-142, states were required to participate in the
federal grant program. Due to the discretionary nature of Pub. L. No. 94-142, however, absent
a state's decision to participate in the federal program and acquire funding, the state is no
longer obligated to implement the educational goals established in the EHA.
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creates a duty on its educational authorities' to insure that all of its
handicapped, 6 school-aged7 children receive a free appropriate public
education. In certain cases, fulfilling this duty may require that a handi-
5. The EHA draws a distinction between the state educational agency (SEA) and the local
educational agency (LEA). The SEA refers to the "State board of education or other agency
or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary
schools. ... 20 U.S.C. § 1401(7) (1976). The SEA is responsible for insuring that: (1) the
eligibility requirements of the Act are carried out; (2) each educational program for handi-
capped children within the state is under the general supervision of the persons responsible
for educating the handicapped in the SEA; (3) the programs meet the educational standards
of the SEA; and (4) the state complies with these responsibilities through local statute or some
other written instrument. 34 C.F.R. § 300.600(a), (b) (1982).
Congress intended the SEA to be primarily responsible and accountable for the Act's im-
plementation. Thus, the SEA is accountable for failures to deliver services, or violations of
handicapped individuals' rights guaranteed by the EHA. S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1975) (the establishment of single agency responsibility for assuring the right to education
for all handicapped children is of paramount importance). Congress understood that while dif-
ferent agencies might deliver various services, the responsibility for overseeing this delivery was
to remain with the SEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 comment (1982).
The LEA, as defined by the Act, is "a public board of education or other public authority
legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to per-
form a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)
(1976). The legislative history indicates that the LEA "becomes the lead agency for assuring
that educational services are appropriate for the handicapped child and that all rights under
this Act and other applicable law extend to such children." 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1446. The LEA is either a state agency, or a political subdivision of the state,
to which the general provisions and regulations of the Act apply. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b) (1982).
The Act places responsibility on the SEA to insure that the LEA provides adequate educational
services to handicapped children. Georgia Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F.
Supp. 1263, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1981). When the LEA fails to do so, the SEA is to provide the
services directly. Id. The term "direct services" is defined as services provided directly to a
handicapped child by the state, contractually or through other arrangements. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.370(b)(1) (1982).
6. The general provisions subchapter of the EHA defines the term "handicapped children"
as: "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children
with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and related
services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976). Regulations further stipulate that handicapped children
are "those children evaluated in accordance with §§ 300.530-.534." 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1982).
These sections pertain to certain procedures for preplacement, evaluation, placement, and reevalua-
tion which the SEA must insure are established and implemented by each public agency. Id.
§§ 300.530-.534. These regulations also define the handicapping conditions listed in the statute.
Id. § 300.5
7. A state is entitled to federal funds for handicapped children aged 3 through 21.
20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (1976).
8. The EHA defines "free appropriate public education" as:
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public ex-
pense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standard of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are pro-
vided in conformity with the individualized education program required under sec-
tion 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). Regulations make it clear that the Act's purpose is to insure
that all handicapped children receive a free appropriate public education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.1(a)
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capped child be placed in a public or private residential program9 at no cost'"
to the child's parents or guardian. Attempts to determine both who should
pay the costs of such placement, and the extent of services required to be
provided at public expense, have generated extensive litigation concerning
interagency liability.'' Most often, this litigation has focused on two issues
(1982). Other statutory provisions also confirm the importance of the free appropriate public
education. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1) (to qualify for federal assistance, a state must have a
policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education),
1412(2)(B) (dates by which a free appropriate public education must be available), 1412(3) (iden-
tifying which handicapped children must be alotted funds first to provide them with a free
appropriate public education), 1413(a)(2) (funds received by a state under any federal program
may be used only in a manner consistent with the goal of providing a free appropriate public
education) (1976).
The two major components of a free appropriate public education are special education and
related services. The EHA declares that " 'special education' means specially designed instruc-
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,
including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and in-
struction in hospitals and institutions." Id. § 1401(16) (implemented by 34 C.F.R. § 300.14
(1982)). The Act further declares:
"related services" means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling
services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education ...
Id. § 1401(17) (implemented by 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982)). For a comparison of the requirements
contained in the implementing regulations with those specified in the federal statute, see OFFICE
OF SPECIAL EDUCATION, BRIEFING PAPER: INITIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS UNDER PART B OF
THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED ACT, As AMENDED (Sept. 1, 1981) [hereinafer cited as
BRIEFING PAPER]. For an overview of the problems which have been discussed in attempting
to determine the definition of a free appropriate public education, see Haggerty & Saks, Education
of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of An Appropriate Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
349 (1975); Comment, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate Education" Under the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 34 ME. L. REV. 79 (198.2) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Enforcing the Right].
9. Public residential programs are provided by public agencies, and political subdivisions
of the state, that are involved in the education of handicapped children. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)
(1982). These agencies include the SEA, the LEA and other state agencies, such as the Depart-
ment of Mental Health; certain state schools, such as those for the deaf and blind, are also
included. Id. § 300.2(b)(1). A private residential program is one which is not provided by a
public agency. The Act's protections extend to children who are referred to, or placed in, private
schools and facilities as a means of providing a free appropriate public education. Id. § 300.2(c).
Thus, handicapped children in private programs must be provided special education and related
services. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976) (a state plan must delineate policies and procedures
which assure that children in private programs have the same rights as those in public programs).
10. When a handicapped child is referred to a private school or facility by a public agency,
the SEA must insure that a free appropriate public education is provided at no cost to the
child's parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976) (implemented by 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2)
(1982)). Regulations define "at no cost" to mean without charge; however, this does not preclude
incidental fees normally charged to nonhandicapped students as part of a regular educational
program. 34 C.F.R. § 300.14(b)(1) (1982). Moreover, if a handicapped child is a ward of the
state, the state is not considered a "parent" to whom no charges may be allocated for placement.
11. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695 (3d Cir. 1981)
(whether residential placement for an emotionally troubled child is necessary for educational
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arising from the political and financial realities surrounding the interagency
liability concept. One involves the distinction between educational and
noneducational placements; 2 the other focuses on whether services provided
in conjunction with placement may be classified properly as "related ser-
vices" and, therefore, within the funding provisions of the Act.' 3
Resolution of these issues requires the following analysis. First, if a hand-
icapped child is placed in a residential program primarily for "educational"
purposes,"' or if a child's emotional and educational needs are so intertwined
as to be inseparable, the placement is considered educational 5 and the EHA
purposes or separable noneducational problems); Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68,
70 (D. Conn. 1981) (a state is required to pay all the costs of residential placement of an
emotionally disturbed student if that student could not be educated without residential place-
ment which offered both a therapy and teaching program); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School
Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 873 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (the guarantee of a free appropriate public education
requires the SEA and LEA to provide residential placement when it is necessary to accomplish
the goals of a child's educational plan); Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1221, 1244 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (the removal of all residential schools from a list of approved schools that treat learning
disabled children conflicts with the EHA if local programs cannot adequately meet the educa-
tional need of such children); Cox v. Brown, 498 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D.D.C. 1980) (granting
parents' request for a preliminary injunction requiring the Department of Defense to place
handicapped children in private residential schools); Erdman v. Connecticut, No. H-80-253 (D.
Conn. Sept. 16, 1980) (a state is required to pay room and board costs if residential placement
is necessary for both educational and noneducational reasons); North v. District of Columbia
Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1979) (a board of education is responsible for
providing residential services to a multiple-handicapped child whose condition requires a residential
treatment facility to provide medical supervision, special education and psychological support);
see also Colley, supra note 1, at 157.
12. Federal regulations provide that "[i]f placement in a public or private residential pro-
gram is necessary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped child,
the program, including nonmedical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents
of the child." 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982). The comment to this regulation specifies that this
requirement applies to placements which are made by public agencies for "educational pur-
poses." Id. Thus, if a residential placement is made for a noneducational purpose, the place-
ment is beyond the scope of this provision and will not necessarily be provided free to the
child's parents.
13. See supra note 8 for the statutory definition of the term "related services." The list
of related services appearing in 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982) was not intended to be exhaustive;
other services may be provided if they are required to assist a handicapped child to benefit
from special education. S. REP. NO. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975). On the other
hand, all the services listed in the regulations may not be required for each handicapped child.
Id. If a service does not appear in the regulations, or is shown to be unnecessary for a handi-
capped child to benefit from special education, that service is not a related service under the
EHA and, therefore, need not be provided directly or indirectly by the SEA.
14. See supra note 12. The EHA provides that the residential placement must be a "means
of carrying out the requirements of this subchapter or any other applicable law requiring the
provision of special education and related services .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976).
The goal of this subchapter is to provide all handicapped children with a free appropriate
public education. Id. § 1413(a)(2). It appears that a placement has an educational purpose
if it is intended to provide a child with special education and related services. The inherent
difficulties stemming from such circuitous reasoning become apparent when courts attempt to
define the concept of educational purpose.
15. In applying the provisions of the EHA, courts have extended the concept of educa-
tional purpose to include those residential placements necessitated by a child's problems when
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requires the educational agency to assume the placement's costs. If, on the
other hand, the placement is primarily for "noneducational" purposes, such
as when the placement is necessitated solely by family or social problems,
financial liability is shifted from the school district to an appropriate service
agency.' 6 Second, the allocation of costs for services provided in the residential
setting is determined by whether a specific service is regarded, under the
the child's educational and noneducational needs are so intertwined as to be inseparable. See,
e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting
a school district's assertion that residential placement is required only for medical and domiciliary
care, rather than for educational purposes, and holding that the unseverability of medical and
educational grounds for residential placement is the very basis for finding that services are
an essential prerequisite to learning, and that placement is therefore educational); Battle v.
Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1980) (because the concept of education is necessarily
broad and includes basic self-help and social skills, and because Congress intended the EHA
to provide education which will make children independent, placement which provides such
education is considered to be educational); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471
F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979) (enjoining a school board from denying a multiple-handicapped
child free placement in a residential program because the child's social, emotional, medical,
and educational needs were so intertwined that it was impossible for the court to separate
them); Ladson v. Board of Educ., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 551:188 (D.D.C.
Mar. 12, 1979) (the residential placement of an 11 year old child suffering from down's syn-
drome, and possessing the mental capacity of an 18 month old infant, was considered educa-
tional because it was necessary to achieve the goals of an educational program); see also Stark,
Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementation
of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REV. 477, 514-16 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Stark]. Stark
concludes that two standards for residential placement have been established. The first, taken
directly from the EHA, focuses on whether residential placement is necessary to provide a
free appropriate public education. The second, taken from North and Kruelle, requires residen-
tial placement when it is impossible to separate a child's emotional and educational problems. Id.
16. In Illinois, if a child is a neglected or dependent minor under 18 years of age and
is adjudged a ward of the juvenile court, the court may commit that child to the Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for care and services. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-707(f)
(1981). Payment for board, clothing, care, training and supervision of any child placed in a
licensed child care facility may be made by the DCFS, the child's parents, or by both. Id.
ch. 23, § 5005. Similarly, when children are placed in facilities operated by the Department
of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD) for purely developmental problems,
costs of residential placements and services are assumed by that agency. Id. ch. 91 , § 1-107;
see In re White, 103 Il. App. 3d 105, 429 N.E.2d 1383 (1982) (holding that the Juvenile Court
Act authorizes placement of mentally retarded children in private licensed educational facilities
which are approved by DMHDD for. placement and its funding ); see also Smith v. Cumberland
School Comm., - R.I. - , 415 A.2d 168 (1980) (a program created under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Mental Health with a primarily therapeutic purpose is noneducational
when educational services are merely incidental to medical and psychiatric services).
Under the EHA, the SEA is required to insure that children receive special education and
related services; this requirement extends to those placements which are provided by a public
agency other than the educational agency, and are considered noneducational. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.341(a) (1982) (this regulation applies to all public agencies, including other state agencies,
such as the DMH and the Department of Welfare, which provide special education to handi-
capped children). Thus, even when a placement is considered noneducational, to the extent
that the educational agency is not responsible for its costs, the child must receive a free ap-
propriate public education whether provided by another public agency directly, by contract
or through other arrangements.
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Act, as "related" or "nonmedical"; 7 such services are necessary to assist
a handicapped child in benefiting from special education. Only these "related"
services fall within the school district's financial responsibility.
Issues concerning whether placement is for educational or noneducational
purposes, and whether a service provided in conjunction with placement is
viewed as related under the EHA, were confronted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in In re Claudia K.'8 In that case, the juvenile court granted a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus' 9 ordering the local school district to assume
full costs, including those relating to psychotherapy,2" for Claudia's place-
ment in a residential program at a private psychiatric hospital. Despite a
strong showing of public interest in the resolution of these controversial issues,
the Illinois Supreme Court based its reversal of the lower court's order solely
on the narrow procedural ground of whether mandamus should have issued.'
Claudia K. is important for several reasons. First, it presented a situation
in which strict adherence to state regulations22 precluded compliance with
the EHA's requirement that all handicapped children be provided with a
free appropriate public education. Second, the decision highlighted the in-
herent complexities in determining whether a placement is for educational
or noneducational purposes. Third, the case provided an opportunity for
the supreme court to decide whether psychotherapy qualifies as a related
service and, thus, is within the financial responsibility of the educational
17. See supra notes 8 & 13. The regulations include medical services as related services
only if they are for diagnostic or evaluative purposes, and are provided by a licensed physician.
34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a), (b)(4) (1982). Furthermore, the regulations declare that the program,
including nonmedical care, room and board shall be provided at no cost. Id. § 300.302. Thus,
if services provided at a residential placement are related, including medical services only for
diagnosis and evaluation, or nonmedical under 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982), costs for those
services fall within the contemplation of the EHA and must be assumed by either the SEA
or the LEA.
18. 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
19. In re Claudia K., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:501 (I11. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1981). The writ of mandamus was sought by Claudia's attending physician and her mother
to compel the district to place Claudia in an appropriate residential facility, and to pay all
of the placement costs. Id.
20. Id. In granting the petition for mandamus, the juvenile court found that psychotherapy
was a related service under both state and federal law. This was the first case in which an
Illinois court explicitly made such a finding, and would have caused the educational agency
to be financially liable for the cost of psychotherapy provided to handicapped children under
the EHA. For a discussion of this highly controversial issue, see Rosenfeld, Psychotherapy
As a "Related Service": A Policy Paper Developed for the Second National Institute on Legal
Problems of Educating the Handicapped, I EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. AC 15 (Supp.
60 Nov. 13, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfeld]; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 8, at 17-21.
21. 91 111. 2d at 479, 440 N.E.2d at 82. The supreme court acknowledged that disposing
of the case on a procedural issue might require further action by the trial court on remand.
Id. The court further acknowledged that nothing in the opinion was intended to preclude Claudia
from receiving the necessary and proper treatment to which she was entitled. Id. Therefore,
it appears that other public agencies might be compelled to provide Claudia with such services.
22. The supreme court found that a state regulation clearly indicated that the school district
lacked the authority to place Claudia in either Ridgeway or Riveredge Hospital. Id. For the
text of this regulation, see infra note 57.
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agency. Finally, Claudia K. determined whether the mandamus amendment
to the Juvenile Court Act23 could be used as an enforcement mechanism
for federal obligations imposed by the EHA.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court resolved the feasibility of using the
Juvenile Court Act's mandamus provision as an EHA enforcement
mechanism," ' the other difficult substantive matters received little attention
from the Claudia K. court.2" There is an urgent need for the supreme court
to interpret certain pivotal provisions of the Act, and to resolve conflicts
created by existing state rules and regulations which prevent compliance with
it. In light of Claudia K. 's failure to resolve these critical issues, this Note
attempts to offer guidance for future resolution of the complex problems
involved in defining the scope of residential placement and related services
under the EHA.
THE DECISION
Claudia K. was a highly intelligent, but emotionally disturbed26 and actively
23. The mandamus amendment to the Juvenile Court Act provides: "Rights of wards of
the court under this Act are enforceable against any public agency by petitions for writs of
mandamus filed in any proceedings brought under this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-8(2)
(1981).
24. The supreme court found that the sole purpose of the mandamus amendment was to
give the juvenile court the power to "compel recalcitrant State custodial agencies to fulfill their
obligations." 91 I1. 2d at 476, 440 N.E.2d at 81.
25. Despite failing to address these issues, the court acknowledged and identified the dif-
ficult questions raised by the case. These included:
the effect to be given Federal regulations in a State court where regulations of
the designated State enforcement agency conflict; the effect, if any, of "letters of
finding" by a Federal oversight agency which indicate State regulations are not
in compliance with Federal guidelines; the effect of a Federal court's order enjoin-
ing certain State enforcement agency practices where the agency has not altered
its policy, . . . as well as an overriding concern as to how to implement a Federal
program which arguably mandates comprehensive care plans without providing suf-
ficient resources for implementation.
Id. at 477, 440 N.E.2d at 81.
26. Brief for Appellees at 3, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982). Children
who are seriously emotionally disturbed are included in the term "handicapped children" as
defined under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Federal regulations define
the term "seriously emotionally disturbed" as follows:
(i) The term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics
over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects educa-
tional performance:
(A) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory,
or health factors;
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers;
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal
or school problems.
(ii) The term includes children who are schizophrenic. The term does not in-
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suicidal27 adolescent. In September of 1980, shortly before her seventeenth
birthday, Claudia was arrested in a tavern by the Wauconda police.2" While
incarcerated at the police station, Claudia set her blankets on fire.29 Charged
with arson, she was adjudicated delinquent and made a ward of the juvenile
court.3" After diagnostic evaluation confirmed Claudia's suicidal condition,
the juvenile court ordered that she be placed at Chicago's Ridgeway Hospital,
a high-security, private residential psychiatric facility.3 On the same day the
order was issued, the court vacated the adjudication of delinquency, entered
an adjudication that Claudia was a neglected minor, and appointed the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as her temporary
guardian.2 The DCFS reported, however, that it had no mechanism by which
to pay for Claudia's care at a private hospital such as Ridgeway."
Nonetheless, Claudia remained at Ridgeway Hospital and charges continued
to accrue.
clude children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they are
seriously emotionally disturbed.
34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8) (1982).
27. Brief for Appellees at 3, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982). Claudia's
actively suicidal condition was the reason that she was rejected for placement at many public
residential facilities which lacked the capability to provide her with the constant supervision
she required.
28. 91 11. 2d at 471, 440 N.E.2d at 78.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Juvenile Court Act provides that a neglected minor is one denied proper or
necessary education, medical or other remedial care, or one whose behavior is injurious to
his own welfare or that of others. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4(1) (1981). Due to Claudia's
self-destructive and suicidal behavior, her status was changed by the juvenile court from delin-
quent to neglected minor. 91 Ill. 2d at 472, 440 N.E.2d at 78. Subsequent to Claudia's in-
carceration, her mother and stepfather refused to allow her to return home, and she ultimately
was placed in a foster home prior to hospitalization.
31. 91 Ill. 2d at 472, 440 N.E.2d at 79. Ridgeway Hospital is a private psychiatric hospital,
not a state mental health facility. Initially, costs at Ridgeway were paid by the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Aid under a special diagnostic program then operated by the Illinois Depart-
ment of Mental Health. This funding ceased, however, after Claudia had been at Ridgeway
for only three weeks.
32. Under the Juvenile Court Act, a neglected minor under 18 years of age may be com-
mitted to DCFS for care and services. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7(1)(f) (1981). The juvenile
court, acting under this authority, ordered DCFS to pay for all the psychological services Claudia
received from the date DCFS was appointed as Claudia's temporary guardian until the guar-
dianship terminated upon the granting of the petition for mandamus. Brief for Appellants at
11, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
33. Brief for Appellants at I1, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
The DCFS has the power to place and fund the placement of any child for whom it has re-
tained temporary custody pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 5005(4)
(1981). Yet, DCFS is required to assume placement costs only for children under 18 years
of age whom DCFS places in a licensed child care facility. Id. Claudia, who was soon to
be 18, was not placed by DCFS, and the facility in which she was placed was not a licensed
child care facility. The uninsured costs of Claudia's private placement at Ridgeway Hospital,
including psychotherapy expenses, were estimated in excess of $90,000 annually. Chicago Tribune,
Oct. 18, 1981, at 1, col. I. Due to these funding problems, Ridgeway was not reimbursed
at the time it delivered services to Claudia; care and treatment were provided gratuitously by
the facility. 91 Ill. 2d at 474, 440 N.E.2d at 80.
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Several months after Claudia's admission to Ridgeway, representatives of
the various public agencies which potentially were responsible for the costs
of Claudia's placement met3" to determine Claudia's special educational needs
and to develop her individualized education program (IEP). 5 The public
34. A preplacement evaluation is required before any action may be taken regarding the
initial placement of a handicapped child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (1982). Such an evaluation is
also required under Illinois law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-822(b) (1981). The preliminary
evaluation occurs at a meeting which is referred to as a multidisciplinary staff conference or
IEP meeting, and is defined as: "a deliberation among appropriate persons for the purpose
of determining eligibility for special education, developing recommendations for special educa-
tion placement, reviewing educational progress, or considering the continuation or termination
of special education for an individual child." Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administra-
tion and Operation of Special Education, art. VIII, Rule 1.05a (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Rules and Regs. of Special Educ.]. Federal regulations require the public agency to insure that
the meeting is composed of a representative of that agency who is qualified to provide special
education, the child's teacher, one or both of the child's parents, the child (when appropriate),
and any other individuals invited at the discretion of the parent or agency. .34 C.F.R. § 300.344
(1982).
In Illinois, the state agencies responsible for assuming the costs of placing special education
students in private residential facilities issued a formal memorandum of understanding in August
of 1980. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Public Aid, Depart-
ment of the Budget, Department of Children and Family Services, Department of Public Health,
Illinois State Board of Education, Department of Rehabilitation Services, and the Governor's
Office, Aug. 26-27, 1980 (adopted September 17, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of
Understanding]. This memorandum outlined the relative liability of these agencies in cooperative
placement decisions. The State Board of Education recognized six categories of special educa-
tion students for whom it considered residential placement to be primarily "noneducational,"
and for which other service agencies might be obligated to pay some or all of the placement
costs. These categories included:
(1) children placed for mental health or developmental disabilities purposes in residen-
tial mental health facilities pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code and the powers and duties of the Department of Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities; (2) children involved in juvenile court proceedings
(or in family situations likely to lead to such proceedings) which would lead to
the involvement of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS); (3)
children who have actions pending in juvenile court seeking adjudication for MINS
or delinquency or are already adjudicated; (4) persons against whom criminal charges
are pending or who have been convicted as adults; (5) status offenders; and (6)
children requiring primarily medical care and treatment.
Id. Arguably, Claudia was within several of these categories. Accordingly, In re Claudia K.
would have been an excellent opportunity to define the relative financial obligations of various
public agencies to provide private residential placements for handicapped children as required
under the EHA.
35. The EHA defines an IEP as:
[a] written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a
representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit
who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed
instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents
or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement
shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of
such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to
such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated dura-
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school personnel at the IEP meeting determined that due to her suicidal con-
dition Claudia was uneducable; she would benefit from educational services
only if her mental condition were stabilized. 6 Consequently, the school district
concluded that finalization and implementation of Claudia's IEP should be
withheld indefinitely until she was no longer actively suicidal. 7
Asserting that Claudia's mental condition necessitated a primarily
noneducational placement, the school district referred her to the Department
of Mental Health (DMH) for stabilization so that she might be receptive
to educational services in the future. 8 The DMH proposed a placement in
tion of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation pro-
cedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether in-
structional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). Similarly defined by Illinois regulations, an IEP is described as
furnishing a declaration of specific special education and related services to be provided at
projected dates of initiation. Rules and Regs. of Special Educ., supra note 34, art. I, Rule
1.02a. The Illinois regulations also require that related services be included in the child's IEP.
Id. art. IX, Rule 9.18(a). For a further explanation of the IEP, see ILLINOIS STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION DEPARTMENT OF SPECIALIZED EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, A PARENT'S GUIDE: THE
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 5 (Sept. 1980) (explaining the nature of a
child's "custom-made education" program, the IEP).
36. Brief for Appellants at 12, In re Claudia K., 91 Il. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
The ultimate placement decision was made exclusively by the public school personnel at the
staff conference. The Memorandum of Understanding requires that the school district invite
the various agency representatives to the conference. See supra note 34. Yet, the representatives
from the different agencies are to provide only technical assistance and a preliminary assess-
ment of eligibility for services. The school personnel make the final decision and are, therefore,
free to disregard any input from other agencies. This situation seems ironic; the school district
already had designated Claudia's placement as primarily "noneducational," and labeled her
"uneducable." Indeed, the district accused the juvenile court of usurping its educational decision-
making functions. Brief for Appellants at 42, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d
78 (1982).
37. 91 111. 2d at 473, 440 N.E.2d at 79. While it is permissible to place a child in a program
temporarily as part of an evaluation before the IEP is finalized and implemented, the tem-
porary placement may not become the final placement. 46 Fed. Reg. 5,464 (1981). The osten-
sibly open-ended placement of Claudia at a public mental health facility until she stabilized
clearly violates this federal regulation. Additionally, a child undergoing assessment and not
officially identified as handicapped is not within the protection of the Act. See 4 MENTAL DIS-
AILITY L. REP. 42 (1980) (a federal court in Minnesota held that a child undergoing assess-
ment for possible emotional problems is not deemed handicapped, and therefore, is not entitl-
ed to the procedural safeguards of the EHA); see also Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp.
989, 992 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (a state law which does not require the IEP to be finalized prior
to placement of a handicapped child conflicts with federal mandates of the EHA).
Federal regulations specify that an IEP must be "in effect" before special education and
related services may be provided to a child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1) (1982). These regulations
further specify that the IEP must be implemented as soon as possible after the IEP meeting.
Id. § 300.342(b)(2). The federal regulations emphasize that no delay is permissible between
the time the IEP is finalized and when the special educational services are provided. Id.
§ 300.342 App. C. Consequently, by deciding neither to finalize nor implement an IEP for
Claudia, the school personnel clearly violated both the letter and the spirit of the EHA and
its implementing regulations.
38. Brief for Appellees at 6, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982). The
school district stated that the DMH has a responsibility to "take suicidal people" such as Claudia.
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the adolescent unit of a public mental health facility." Yet, as the DMH
acknowledged,"' the problems involved with such placement were: (1) the
funding of Claudia's tenure at a public mental health facility would ter-
minate upon her eighteenth birthday;4 and (2) the average stay at the pro-
posed state operated facility was only five months, due to a policy of
discharging a patient once the problem which necessitated her admission had
subsided.42 Based on these shortcomings, the proposed state facility was re-
jected by Claudia's mother and therapists. 3
On July 31, 1981, six months after Claudia had been placed at Ridgeway,
the juvenile court granted an emergency petition, filed on Claudia's behalf,
requesting a writ of mandamus to issue against the school district. 44 The
petition requested that the district be required to place Claudia in an
appropriate residential facility. 45 The juvenile court entered an order in favor
of Claudia, finding that she was a handicappped child4 6 eligible for special
39. Reply Brief for Appellants at 20, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
Under the Illinois Code of Mental Health, the DMH is obligated to provide all patients be-
tween the ages of 5 and 21, who reside in mental health facilities, with special education ser-
vices to the extent that such services are "practical for each child's needs." ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 91 V2, § 100-11.1 (1981). By classifying Claudia as uneducable, the school district apparently
precluded her from receiving such services because she could have no practical need for education.
40. Reply Brief for Appellants at 20, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
41. Id.
42. Brief for Appellees at 4, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
43. Brief for Appellants at 21-22, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
The one public mental health facility found acceptable to all concerned refused to accept Claudia
for admission, or even for evaluation, because it was not equipped to handle an actively suicidal
adolescent. Therefore, Claudia was rejected as an inappropriate referral. Id.
44. In re Claudia K., 3 EDuc. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:501 (11. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1981).
45. In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982). An appropriate facility for
Claudia was one which could provide her with long-term, residential placement and was equip-
ped to provide an actively suicidal child with medical, psychotherapeutic and educational ser-
vices as well as constant supervision when necessary. Id. at 474, 440 N.E.2d at 80 (finding
of the circuit court).
46. The juvenile court found that Claudia was handicapped under both federal and state
law. In re Claudia K., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:501 (111. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1981). Illinois law defines handicapped children as:
children between the ages of 3 and 21 for whom it is determined, through pro-
cedures described in the Illinois Rules and Regulations to Govern the Organization
and Administration of Special Education, that special education services are needed.
An individualized education program must be written and agreed upon by appropriate
school personnel and parents or their representatives for any child receiving special
education.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.02 (1982) (emphasis added). Illinois regulations provide the
same sort of circuitous definition by using the word exceptional instead of handicapped. One
Illinois regulation defines exceptional children as those designated in Article XIV of the Illinois
School Code. See Rules and Regs. of Special Educ., supra note 34, art. VII, Rule 1.02; see
also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1982). Section 14-7.02 outlines the procedures and
criteria for evaluating a child's needs for special educational services. A more substantive definition
of exceptional children is found in another state regulation which includes "behavior disorder"
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education and related services under the EHA."7 The court further found
that psychotherapy was a related service under the Act. 8 The school district
was directed to place Claudia in an appropriate residential program, and
to assume full costs for her placement and all related services."9
Subsequent to this order, the school district continued to fail in its efforts
to locate an appropriate placement for Claudia and, consequently, she re-
mained at Ridgeway Hospital until December of 1981.50 At that time, the
as a handicapping condition that specifically interferes with a child's learning or social func-
tioning. Rules and Regs. of Special Educ., supra note 34, art. 11, Rule 9.16. This condition
seems to apply to Claudia. See ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, THE ILLINOIS PRIMER
ON INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAMS C-3 (Jan. 1981) (Illinois' definition of handicapped
children is essentially identical to that provided in federal regulations) [hereinafter cited as ILLINOIS
PRIMER].
47. By classifying Claudia as a handicapped child under the EHA, the juvenile court essen-
tially completed the special education eligibility evaluation which the multidisciplinary staff meeting
had failed to finalize. See supra note 37. Thus, it appears that rather than abuse its man-
damus authority, the juvenile court brought the state and the educational agency into com-
pliance with the requirements of the EHA.
48. The terms "medical services," "counseling services," and "psychological services" are
defined in the EHA under "Related Services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982). The term
"psychotherapy," however, is not used in the Act or in its implementing regulations. See BRIEFnc
PAPER, supra note 8, at 18; see also Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn.
1981) (psychological services that were required to assist an emotionally disturbed student to
benefit from special education were discussed by the court under a section entitled
"Psychotherapy," and were held to be within the psychological services provision of the EHA);
In re "A" Family, __ Mont. - , - , 602 P.2d 157, 165 (1979) (although the word
psychotherapy is not specifically mentioned in the federal statutes or regulations, Webster's
dictionary defines the term as "treatment of mental or emotional disorder or of related body
ills by psychological means"; therefore, psychotherapy falls within the psychological services
provision of the EHA); Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at AC 32. In a 1980 draft policy statement
on psychotherapy issued by the Office of Special Education (OSE), one of the two federal
regulatory agencies responsible for overseeing the implementation of the EHA, OSE would
have required educational agencies to pay for psychotherapy if the service was: (a) labeled
"psychological" or "counseling"; (b) provided by nonmedical personnel; or (c) provided by
medical personnel as "other qualified personnel." 13 EDUC. DAILY 107, § 1 (June 2, 1980).
Due to the absence of any specific reference to psychotherapy in the Act, each state is free
to interpret the word in terms of its own labeling scheme, classifying it as either a medical,
counseling or psychological service. The classification chosen by the state determines whether
psychotherapy falls within one of the related services under the EHA which must be provided
by the educational agency. See Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (in
construing the related services provision of the EHA, courts must look to state law to deter-
mine whether a service is medical, counseling or psychological; thus, the Act tolerates nonuniform
application to the extent that a given service may be a related service under by the EHA in
one state, and an exempt medical service in another state).
49. In re Claudia K., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:501 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1982). The school district failed to act promptly in locating an appropriate residential place-
ment for Claudia. Consequently, in August of 1981, the juvenile court issued an amended order
finding all DMH facilities, other than the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute, inappropriate for
Claudia and directing the district to effectuate placement by September of 1981. Id. (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 28, 1981) (order amending previous order of July 31, 1981).
50. The school district contended that it had contacted 12 appropriate placements which
refused to accept Claudia while she was actively suicidal. Brief for Appellants at 21, In re
Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
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administrator of Ridgeway testified that the hospital could do nothing more
for Claudia.5' In response, the juvenile court ordered that Claudia be trans-
ferred to Riveredge Hospital, another private psychiatric facility, to undergo
diagnostic evaluation in preparation for an appropriate placement. 2 This
order also directed the school district to assume full costs for the evaluation
of any ongoing treatment provided to Claudia at Riveredge.Y Moreover, the
order directed the school district to pay for all costs of care and services
Claudia previously had incurred at Ridgeway Hospital."4
The school district, disclaiming all financial liability for Claudia's care
and treatment, 5 appealed from the juvenile court's order directly to the
Illinois Supreme Court. The supreme court reversed the lower court's order
solely on the procedural issue of mandamus and remanded the cause to the
juvenile court for further disposition."
51. 91 IlI. 2d at 474, 440 N.E.2d at 80.
52. Id. Brown School in Texas responded that it might be willing to accept Claudia for
residential placement pending the results of an independent 90 day evaluation. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. These costs included psychotherapy, which the juvenile court found to be a related
service under the Act, and for which the school district was, therefore, financially responsible
to provide as part of Claudia's free appropriate public education.
55. Under Illinois law, placement costs must be assumed by an appropriate public agency
when a child is placed in a private residential facility that has been both programmatically
approved by the Illinois State Board of Education, and cost approved by the Governor's Pur-
chased Care Review Board ("Review Board"). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1982); see
also infra notes 65-66. The school district in Claudia K. maintained that Claudia had not been
placed by the district, and that neither Ridgeway nor Riveredge Hospital was approved by
the Review Board. Additionally, the district insisted that psychotherapy could not be a related
service for which it was liable because no special education program had been designed for
Claudia; thus, there was nothing to which psychotherapy could relate. 91 Ill. 2d at 471, 440
N.E.2d at 80. By refusing to finalize Claudia's IEP, the school district essentially had made
it impossible for her to receive either special education or related services under the EHA.
34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1) (1982) (an IEP must be in effect before special education and related
services may be provided to a handicapped child). This refusal also rendered Claudia ineligible
for special educational placement under state law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02(b) (1981)
(no child is eligible for special education placement without a carefully completed case study
fully reviewed by a staff conference).
56. 91 II. 2d at 474, 440 N.E.2d at 82 (1982). The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
emergency petition for mandamus granted by the juvenile court was improper. The supreme
court concluded that the school district had no "clear duty" to place Claudia in either of
the private, unapproved facilities in which she had been placed. This conclusion was based
on a single state regulation, Rule 1.04 of the Rules and Regulations for Approval of Non-
public Facilities Educating Handicapped Students, which provides:
No nonpublic facility shall be utilized by a district until: (1) The facility is approv-
ed by the SBE, (2) Costs have been established for it by the Governor's Purchased
Care Review Board, (3) Proposed residential placements are reviewed and approved
by the Illinois State Board of Education prior to placement. . . . Adopted Amend-
ments to the Rules and Regulations for Approval of Non-public Facilities Educating
Handicapped Students under section 14-7.02 of the School Code, 5 Ill. Reg. 4577
(April 24, 1981).
91 11. 2d at 479, 440 N.E.2d at 82; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1981). But
cf. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Il. App. 3d 1053, 438 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1982) (concluding that
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THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Neither the educational/noneducational placement issue, nor the issue of
whether psychotherapy is a related service under the EHA, was addressed
in the Claudia K. opinion."7 The single and dispositive issue in the case was
whether the juvenile court properly granted the petition for a writ of man-
damus. Initially, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed the general mandamus
power of the juvenile court. 8 The supreme court then interpreted the man-
damus provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act." In 1980, the Juvenile
Court Act was amended to authorize juvenile courts to grant writs of man-
damus to enforce the rights of minor wards against public agencies.6" In
this case of first impression, 6' the supreme court stated that the sole pur-
pose of the mandamus provision was to provide the juvenile courts with
power to "compel recalcitrant . . . state agencies to fulfill their legal obliga-
tions" to the courts' wards.62 Acknowledging that obligations had been im-
posed on the school district by the EHA, 63 the court proceeded to analyze
the mechanics of the mandamus action.
The Claudia K. court recognized two prerequisites for mandamus to issue:
a " 'clear duty' on the part of the defendant to do the act sought to be
compelled, and a 'clear right' on the part of the plaintiff to the prayed-for
relief." 6 ' To determine whether the school district had a clear duty to place
Claudia at either Ridgeway or Riveredge Hospital, the court examined Rule
1.04 of the Illinois School Code's Rules and Regulations for Approval of
the residential placement in which a student received instruction in an integrated treatment
program was within the EHA's definition of special education and related services, the court
found the school district liable, due to its long delay in determining appropriate placement,
for the costs of placing the emotionally disturbed child in an unapproved residential program).
57. None of the substantive educational issues raised in the case was addressed by the supreme
court. Discussion or resolution of such issues was rendered unnecessary by the initial finding
of procedural error in the granting of the petition for writ of mandamus.
58. The supreme court noted that the juvenile court is a division of the circuit court which
has jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9. The issuance of writs
of mandamus lies within the power and jurisdiction of the circuit courts and, therefore, of
the juvenile court. 91 Ill. 2d at 475, 440 N.E.2d at 80.
59. The Juvenile Court Act was designed to provide protection, care, custody and guar-
dianship for minors who are adjudged delinquent, neglected, dependent, or "otherwise in need
of supervision." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(l) (1981). Every child who is declared to
be a ward of the court under the Juvenile Court Act is guaranteed a right to those services
necessary to his or her proper development, including health, educational and social services.
Id. § 701-2(3)(b).
60. Id. § 705-8(2); see supra note 23 for the text of the mandamus amendment to the Juvenile
Court Act.
61. In re Claudia K. was the first case in which the Illinois Supreme Court articulated
the specific purpose of the mandamus amendment to the Juvenile Court Act. 91 IlI. 2d at
475-76, 440 N.E.2d at 80-81.
62. Id. at 476, 440 N.E.2d at 81.
63. Id. at 472-73, 440 N.E.2d at 79. The supreme court acknowledged that the school district's
involvement in the case resulted from obligations imposed on it by the EHA, its implementing
regulations, and state law. Id.
64. Id. at 477, 440 N.E.2d at 81.
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Non-public Facilities Educating Handicapped Students.6" This rule prohibits
65. Under Rule 1.04 of the Rules and Regulations for Approval of Non-public Facilities
Educating Handicapped Students, no nonpublic facility may be utilized by a school district
until the facility is programmatically approved by the Illinois State Board of Education and
cost approved by the Review Board. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1981); see also
supra notes 55-56. The Review Board consists of the Directors of the Departments of Children
and Family Services, Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Public Health, Vocational
Rehabilitation, the Bureau of the Budget, and the State Superintendent of Education, as well
as any other individuals designated by the Governor of Illinois. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 14-7.02 (1981). One of the Review Board's duties is to review costs, including tuition, room,
board, and services, for special education and related services provided by nonpublic schools
or special education facilities, and to approve or disapprove such facilities for residential place-
ment of handicapped students. Id.
The Review Board met on October 6, 1981, and cost approved Riveredge Hospital for the
1981-82 school year. See Memorandum from Governor's Purchased Care Review Board to Con-
troller, Riveredge Hospital (October 8, 1981) (approving costs of tuition, room and board for
in-state residential placement effective October 6, 1981). Riveredge Hospital was not program-
matically approved, however, and Ridgeway Hospital was neither cost nor programmatically
approved. 91 111. 2d at 479, 440 N.E.2d at 82. The school district expressed doubt as to whether
any currently approved facility would have accepted Claudia, an actively suicidal adolescent,
for residential placement. Brief for Appellants at 6, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d
78 (1982). The issue of approval was further complicated by the Memorandum of Understan-
ding, in which the public agencies involved in cooperative residential placements agreed that
no new psychiatric hospitals would be approved for the 1980-81 term. See supra note 34 &
infra note 67.
In analyzing whether the school district had a "clear duty" to place Claudia in either Ridgeway
or Riveredge Hospitai, the Illinois Supreme Court cited § 14-7.02 of the School Code. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1979) (placing a ceiling on tuition for residential placements
of handicapped children). The supreme court found -that this section could be construed as
authorizing placement in a nonapproved facility while denying reimbursement. 91 Il1. 2d at
478, 440 N.E.2d at 81. Because such a construction was not dispositive of the school district's
liability, the court focused on another state regulation. See supra note 56. Interestingly, § 14-7.02
has been the statutory basis upon which both the Board of Education and the Review Board
have been held in violation of the EHA for failure to provide a free appropriate public educa-
tion to handicapped students. See Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 Il1. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d
1137 (lst Dist. 1978) (holding that § 14-7.02 violated article X, § 1 of the Illinois Constitution
by depriving handicapped children of tuition-free education through limiting the amount of
tuition to be paid by local school districts to $2,500 for special education services in nonpublic
schools or special education facilities). Elliot was argued solely on the basis that § 14-7.02
violated the state constitution. Nevertheless, the Elliot court noted:
An aspect of this problem which does not appear of record, nor in the arguments
of counsel, concerns Illinois' conformity with the provisions of the Federal Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ...
The recently concluded session of the 80th General Assembly has passed legisla-
tion which once again amends section 14-7.02 of The School Code. . . On August
25, 1978, this legislation became law and went into effect with the Governor's
signature. (P.A. 80-1405.) The new section 14-7.02 provides for full tuition payments
for handicapped students attending private facilities, and formally brings the State
into compliance with the funding provisions of the Federal Act.
64 Il1. App. 3d at 238 n.5, 380 N.E.2d at 1143-44 n.5. One commentator has predicted that
the Review Board's disapproval of tuition and related service expenses under the amended ver-
sion of § 14-7.02 still might violate the Elliot court's interpretation of the Illinois Constitution.
See Kula, The Right to Special Education in Illinois-Something Old and Something New,
55 CHi.[-IKENT L. REv. 649, 677-81 (1979).
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any school district from utilizing a nonpublic facility for placement of a
handicapped student until the facility has been both programmatically ap-
proved by the Illinois State Board of Education, and cost approved by the
Governor's Purchased Care Review Board." Because both Ridgeway and
Riveredge Hospitals are nonpublic facilities, each had to meet the re-
quirements of Rule 1.04.
Ridgeway Hospital was neither programmatically nor cost approved.67
Since the 1978 amendment to § 14-7.02, at least one federal court has found that the school
board's refusal to pay the expenses of a handicapped child's private residential placement, on
the grounds that it has no authority to do so under § 14-7.02, is violative of and preemp-
ted by the EHA's requirements. That court declared:
There is no dispute that the outstanding bill for services provided . . . involves
the provision of special education and related services. There is also no dispute
that placement . . . was necessary . . . in order to provide . . . special education
and related services. This being the case, the unambiguous mandate of federal law
is that these services be provided at no cost to Lester's parents. While defendants'
refusal to meet fully Lester's expenses may be authorized by state law, such laws
are inconsistent with the mandate to provide an appropriate free public education
and cannot stand.
Defendants launch a number of arguments which are entirely irrelevant to the
case at hand. First, defendants argue that the members of [the Review Board] are
not authorized under state law to provide plaintiffs with the relief they seek. That
is exactly the problem. The nub of this case is that state law is inconsistent with
the EHA. Since the [Review Board] is bound by the EHA, it is the EHA itself
which requires the [Review Board] to alter its practices, and protect plaintiffs' right
to a free appropriate public education.
Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Letter from Office
of Civil Rights (OCR) to the Governor's Purchased Care Review Board (Feb. 27, 1980) (Illinois'
attempt to place ceiling on tuition, room and board costs for special education placement criticized
by OCR), reprinted in 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 257:82 (Supp. 22, Apr. 18,
1980), noted in Stark, supra note 15, at 492-93 ("Illinois was criticized by OCR recently for
attempting to place a $4,500 limit on the amount expendable for any special education child,
a figure far less than the typical cost of residential placement"); cf. Note, Illinois' State Sub-
sidy of Special Education at Private Institutions Act, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 778-82 (1979)
(while Illinois has indicated a good faith commitment to the EHA by its passage of an amend-
ment to § 14-7.02, the Illinois General Assembly has expressed concern regarding its enforce-
ment in light of financial considerations).
66. See supra note 65. If a handicapped child is placed in an approved program and the
costs, including tuition, room and board, have been approved by the Review Board, the costs
of placement must be assumed by the appropriate state agency at public expense. See Rules
and Regs. of Special Educ., supra note 34, art. VIII, Rule 8.01 (1981) (enacted pursuant to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (1982)). Rule 8.01 places all special education programs
administered by any state agency under the general supervision of the State Board of Educa-
tion. Id. For this reason, all private placements must be programmatically approved by the
Illinois Office of Education.
A private facility becomes approved for special education funding once it satisfies nine specified
criteria. See id. art. VIII, Rule 8.05(2)(a-i). In the Memorandum of Understanding adopted
by the state agencies responsible for residential placements of handicapped children, the SEA
agreed that no new psychiatric hospitals would be approved for 1980-81 funding. See supra
note 34. It further agreed that any new placements in currently approved facilities would be
prohibited. These agreements seem to make it impossible to find an appropriate placement
for Claudia in an approved private psychiatric hospital.
67. 91 Ill. 2d at 478, 440 N.E.2d at 82.
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Riveredge Hospital, to which Claudia was transferred, was not cost
approved.6 Thus, even if the school district had ascertained that one of
these private facilities was appropriate for Claudia's placement, the supreme
court concluded that under Rule 1.04 the school district lacked the authority
to place her at either facility.69 The court held that, in the absence of this
authority, no clear duty existed on the part of the school district; hence,
mandamus could not issue.7"
CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The court relied on Rule 1.04 to determine that the school district had
no clear duty to place Claudia in Ridgeway or Riveredge Hospital, or to
assume placement costs. 7 Rather than rely on an Illinois School Code Rule
to deny the existence of the school district's duty to Claudia, the Illinois
Supreme Court could have invoked the doctrine of federal preemption to
hold that a state or local rule which precludes a state from fulfilling federal
obligations, upon which federal funding is premised, contravenes the preemp-
tion doctrine and, therefore, is invalid.72
The preemption doctrine arises from the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which provides that no state law shall be in conflict
with the "laws of the United States." 3 There are basically three situations
in which preemption occurs."4 First, Congress may expressly declare that
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Having found that the school district had no clear duty, due to its lack of authority
to place Claudia in unapproved, nonpublic facilities such as Ridgeway and Riveredge Hospitals,
the supreme court was able to determine that the writ of mandamus should not have issued
and to avoid reaching the issue of Claudia's "clear right". to the relief sought.
71. Rule 1.04, Adopted Amendments to the Rules and Regulations for Approval of Non-
public Facilities Educating Handicapped Students (enacted pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
§ 14-7.02 (1981)), 5 Ill. Reg. 4577 (April 24, 1981). For a discussion of Rule 1.04, see supra
note 57.
72. The preemption approach has been employed to relieve a handicapped child's parents
from having to pay a relative liability charge, assessed against them for their child's placement
in a residential special education facility by the DMHDD under a similar provision of the Men-
tal Health Code. Parks v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health, 110 Il. App. 3d 184, 441 N.E.2d
1209 (1st Dist. 1982) (imposition of a relative liability charge cannot stand in light of the express
language of the EHA to provide a free appropriate public education at no expense to the child's
parents); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91' 2, § 1-100 (1979). The preemptive approach also
was used to grant the same plaintiffs an injunction which prohibited their child's discharge
from a residential facility, although the parents had failed to pay the liability charges assessed
against them from the two previous years. Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 304 (N.D.
I1. 1982) (when placement is necessary to provide a handicapped child with special education
and related services, even though DMHDD's refusal to pay full expenses for placement in authorized
by Illinois law, such state law is preempted by the federal mandate to provide a free appropriate
public education).
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. State law in conflict with federal statutes is nullified to the
extent that it conflicts with federal law. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,
102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982) (federal, regulations implementing federal statutes have the same
preemptive effect as the statutes which they implement).
74. See, e.g., People v. Kerr McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 1982).
19831
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:483
federal authority over a particular subject area is to be exclusive.75 Second,
preemption may be implied by the language and legislative history of a federal
statute.76 Third, if a clear conflict between federal and state law makes it
impossible to comply with both laws, state law may be invalidated to permit
compliance with federal law.77 The existence of any one of these situations
is sufficient to render a state or local law unconstitutional."
Despite the Act's failure to explicitly require exclusive federal authority
over education of the handicapped, both the language and legislative history
of the statute imply preemption.79 Thus, to assess whether Rule 1.04 was
preempted by the EHA, the Illinois Supreme Court should have examined
the language and legislative history of the EHA80 to determine whether they
indicate preemptive intent.
The EHA was enacted in response to specific congressional findings which
revealed that more than half of the eight million handicapped children in
the United States were either receiving no public education, or were receiving
some type of public education but were being denied equal opportunity
because of the lack of adequate services within particular public school
systems.' Congress expressly stated that, given appropriate funding, state
75. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022.
77. See, e.g., id.
78. See, e.g., Olsen v. Financial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 105 111. App. 3d 364, 366-67,
434 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1st Dist. 1982).
79. The language of the EHA contains a statement of congressional findings which provides:
given appropriate funding, State and local educational agencies can and will pro-
vide effective special education and related services to meet the needs of handi-
capped children;
(8) State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide educa-
tion for all handicapped children, but present financial resources are inadequate
to meet the special educational needs of handicapped chidren; and
(9) it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and
local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children in order to assure equal protection of the law.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(7)-(9) (Supp V. 1981) (emphasis added). The Act's legislative history reveals
that Congress intended to make public education available to all handicapped children by means
of specialized educational services. While the EHA was designed to provide assistance to states
in educating all handicapped chidren, the Act's primary intent was to "bolster the rights of
handicapped children and their parents to assure that the right to education is firmly established."
121 CONG. REc. 19,494 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams). The EHA places a priority on
the handicapped child's right to education. "While the responsibility for education . . . has
• . . rested with the States, it is also the responsibility of the Federal Government to assist
the States when they are unable to provide necessary educational services." Id. (statement of
Sen. Javits). These statements contained in the statute and its legislative history clearly demonstrate
that once a state is allocated federal funds, it must provide all handicapped children with a
free appropriate public education. Cf Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3043 (1982)
(Congress sought to provide assistance to the states in fulfilling their responsibility under the
Constitution to provide equal protection of the law).
80. For a sample of the EHA's legislative history, see S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425-508.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(l)-(9) (1976) (congressional findings); see also 121 CoNG. REc. 37,420
(1975) (statements of Sen. Hathway); id. at 37,417 (statements of Sen. Schweiker); id. at 37,028
(statements of Sen. Ford).
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and local educational agencies "can and will" provide effective special educa-
tion and related services. 2 Congress stressed the responsibility of state educa-
tional agencies to provide education for "all" handicapped children. 3 The
emphasis on all is clearly apparent from the Act's express designation as
funding priorities those children not receiving education and those most
severely handicapped who are receiving inadequate education."' Thus, in en-
acting the EHA, Congress made clear its intent that no handicapped child
in any state receiving EHA funding shall be deprived of a free appropriate
public education.8
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(7) (1976).
83. See, e.g., 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1468 (each state must have a
current policy which assures that all handicapped children have the right to a free appropriate
public education); id. at 1432 (the educational amendments of 1974 incorporated the major
principles of the right to education cases, and added a new provision to the EHA which re-
quires states to provide full educational opportunities to all handicapped children); id. at 1434
(by requiring that a free appropriate public education be available to all handicapped children,
a state remains responsible for providing appropriate education at no cost to the child's parents);
id. at 1437 ("it is the intent of the Committee to establish and protect the right to education
for all handicapped children and to assist the States in carrying out their responsibilities under
state law and the Constitution of the United States to provide equal protection of the laws");
id. at 1441 (the Office of Education has adopted the goal of providing a free appropriate
public education for all handicapped children); id. at 1456 (the committee bill stipulates that
a free appropriate public education should be available to all children within the state as a
matter of public responsibility); see also 121 CONG. REC. 37,418 (1975) (statements of Sen.
Biden) (there must be an assurance of an effective policy which guarantees the right of all
handicapped children to a free appropriate public education); cf. Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F.
Supp. 296, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (the Act's history clearly indicates that the purpose of the
EHA is to assure that all handicapped children have a free appropriate public education available
to them) (citing 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1446).
84. The funding priorities are delineated in both the EHA and its implementing regula-
tions. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320-.322 (1982). These priorities re-
quire that funding be allotted to "first priority children," those who are eligible for special
education and are not receiving any education, and "second priority children," those who are
eligible for services, have the most severe handicaps and are receiving inadequate services. Both
the state and local educational agencies must allocate federal funds according to these priorities.
Id. § 300.321 comment. At the time Claudia K. appeared before the juvenile court, she was
a first priority child as defined by the EHA.
85. Prior to the EHA's enactment, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
flatly rejected the position that the "Federal Government should only mandate services to handi-
capped children if . . . funds are appropriated in sufficient amounts to cover the full cost
of education," as grounds for a state's refusal to provide a handicapped child with special
education and related services. 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1446; cf. Tatro
v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1980) (the mandate of the Act requiring the provision
of a free appropriate public education is unequivocal). The congressional committee acknowledged
both a state's primary responsibility to uphold the United States Constitution, its state con-
stitution and state laws, and Congress's own responsibility to insure equal protection of the
laws. 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1446. The hierarchy of the responsibilities
identified in this acknowledgment, as well as the committee's refusal to excuse a state from
providing services by claiming a lack of adequate funds, support an inference of federal
preemption.
There is a significant and growing body of case law dealing with issues litigated under the
EHA in which both federal and state courts have taken a preemptive approach in order to
bring a state into compliance with the Act's requirements. See e.g., Helms v. McDaniel, 657
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The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Rowley,8"
recognized Congress's intent to provide all handicapped children with an ap-
propriate education. The Rowley Court, interpreting the EHA, declared that
the Act's statutory findings and priorities, its painstaking procedural
safeguards, and its rigorous definition of free appropriate public education
demonstrate "a congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped
children into the public education system and to require the states to adopt
procedures which ...result in individualized instruction for each child." 87
The Rowley Court's unequivocal interpretation of the congressional in-
tent underlying the EHA suggests the presence of the third situation in which
preemption may occur; when it is impossible to comply with both federal
and state law, state law will be invalidated. 8 Thus, any local law that prevents
a state from realizing the EHA'S substantive provisions, which require a
state to provide all handicapped, school-aged children with special educa-
tion and related services, should be declared invalid. 9 Applying this analysis
F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1981) (state review procedures were found to conflict with the EHA,
both formally and substantively, and would not be permitted to nullify the entire system of
procedural safeguards by which Congress intended to assure the right to appropriate educa-
tion); Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 306 (8th Cir. 1981) (court applied
federal law, not state law, in determining appropriate education because the state law standard
could have resulted in a failure to fulfill the handicapped child's needs); Town of Burlington
v. Department of Educ., 655 F.2d 428, 431 (1st Cir. 1981) (federal specification for review
under the EHA is designed to occupy the field over inconsistent state provisions); Parks v.
Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 304 (N.D. 111. 1982) (the EHA requires review boards to alter
practices that conflict with the Act); Blomstrom v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 532 F. Supp.
707, 709 (D. Mass. 1982) (federal specification for review under the Act occupies the field
over inconsistent state provisions); Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. Conn.
1981) (the denial of payment for room and board by a school district, on the grounds that
placement is for noneducational reasons, conflicts with the EHA's requirement to provide a
free appropriate public education); Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759,
761 (D. Mass. 1981) (a court should disregard any arguments and contentions of parties founded
upon inconsistent state provisions in determining the appropriateness of private placement for
a handicapped child); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1087-88 (D. Neb. 1980)
(a federal court should not exercise abstention when state law conflicts with federally mandated
procedures under the EHA and, therefore, constitutes a supremacy clause claim).
Recently, an Illinois appellate court applied the doctrine of federal preemption to prevent
the DMHDD from enforcing a state law which permits the agency to assess a relative liability
charge against the parents of a handicapped child placed in a residential special education facility.
See Parks v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 110 111. App.
3d 184, 186, 441 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (1st Dist. 1982) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 ,'z, § 5-105 (1979)).
Relying on the reasoning of Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. I11. 1982), the ap-
pellate court concluded that the imposition of the relative liability charge, authorized by state
statute, was invalid under the doctrine of federal preemption in light of the express language
of the EHA and its implementing regulations. 110 I11. App. 3d at 186, 441 N.E.2d at 1212.
86. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982) (although the EHA places primary responsibility with the states
for executing educational programs for the handicapped, the Act significantly regulates how
the states may discharge that responsibility).
87. Id. at 3042.
88. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243 (1963) (state law is
nullified when compliance with both federal and state regulations is physically impossible).
89. See, e.g., Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 304 (N.D. I11. 1982) (state law found
to be inconsistent with the EHA's requirements was declared to be preempted by the Act);
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to the facts in Claudia K., the state regulation should have been declared
invalid because Rule 1.04 prevented Illinois, a state receiving federal fund-
ing under the EHA, from fulfilling the obligations imposed upon it by the
Act."°
Claudia, a handicapped, school-aged child, required residential placement
and psychotherapy in order to obtain an appropriate education. Yet, the
only facilities both willing to accept her, and equipped to meet her special
educational needs and provide the necessary related services, were private,
unapproved9 ' psychiatric hospitals. Rule 1.04 prohibits a school district from
placing a student in any unapproved, nonpublic facility.92 In Claudia's par-
ticular case, this rule created a conflict which made it impossible for Illinois
to comply with the EHA.9 3 The Illinois Supreme Court could have invoked
the doctrine of preemption to invalidate Rule 1.04, thereby enabling the school
district to provide Claudia with a free appropriate public education as re-
quired by the EHA. Despite such convincing arguments for preemption, the
Illinois Supreme Court, relied on Rule 1.04 to find that the school district
had no clear duty to place Claudia at either Ridgeway or Riveredge Hospital
and, therefore, mandamus could not properly issue.1
4
EDUCABILITY UNDER THE EHA
The school district in Claudia K. maintained that if any duty existed under
Parks v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 110 Ill. App. 3d 184,
441 N.E.2d 1209 (1st Dist. 1982) (while DMHDD's refusal to pay costs may be authorized
by state law, that law is inconsistent with, and therefore, preempted by the federal mandate
that all expenditures for the education and welfare of the handicapped child be assumed by
the state's educational authorities); see also supra note 65.
90. Because the Illinois Supreme Court chose not to apply the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion, it should have made Claudia's particular situation an exception to the state rule; this
would have prevented the absurdity of the state being unable to offer her an appropriate, approved
placement. See Helvering v. Hammell, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941) (exceptions to statutes should
be implied when they are necessary to prevent absurd results or consequences which obviously
are at variance with the policy of the statute as a whole). The consequences Claudia faced
due to the supreme court's failure to preempt the state rule clearly were at odds with the pur-
poses and goals of the EHA. See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1212-13 (7th Cir.
1981) (in enacting the EHA, Congress was concerned primarily with meeting the needs of han-
dicapped children; the Act's legislative history reveals an emphasis on procedural safeguards
to insure that handicapped children receive appropriate placements).
91. See supra notes 65 and 66.
92. See supra note 56.
93. Under the EHA, Illinois must provide all its handicapped school-aged children with
a free appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976) (to qualify for federal
assistance, states must have a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free
appropriate public education, and makes a free appropriate public education available to all
children between the ages of 3 and 21). Claudia K. was a school-aged, handicapped child. No
private, approved residential placement could furnish her with the special education and related
services necessary for Claudia to receive a free appropriate public education. Two private, unap-
proved placements could provide her with a free appropriate public education, but State Rule
1.04 prohibited her placement in these unapproved facilities and, thereby, prohibited Illinois
from complying with federal law. See supra note 56.
94. 91 Ill. 2d at 479, 440 N.E.2d at 82.
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the EHA to provide a handicapped child with a free appropriate public educa-
tion, the duty only extended to "educable" handicapped children." The
school district further maintained that Claudia's unstable condition rendered
her "uneducable" and, therefore, the district had no duty to provide Claudia
with the Act's guarantees.96 Finding that the school district had no clear
duty to place Claudia in either Ridgeway or Riveredge Hospital, the Illinois
Supreme Court was able to avoid the question of whether the EHA pro-
vided Claudia with a "clear right" to receive a free appropriate public educa-
tion and all its related services.97 Because the court did not address this issue,
confusion will continue to pervade the lower courts. Consequently, it is
necessary to discuss the existence of a clear right to an education" in rela-
tion to the concept of educability under the EHA.
By enacting the EHA, Congress intended to bring all handicapped children
presently excluded from receiving an adequate public education into the public
education system, and to require states accepting federal funds to provide
individualized consideration and instruction to each handicapped child.99 In-
95. Brief for Appellants at 12, In re Claudia K., 91 11. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
The school district decided that Claudia needed to be stabilized before she could be educated
and, therefore, referred her to DMHDD. Id. The school district asserted that DMHDD has
the responsibility to take suicidal people; accordingly, Claudia was that agency's "problem."
Brief for Appellees at 6, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
96. Brief for Appellants at 13, In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982). The
determination that Claudia was uneducable was based only on Claudia's conduct while she
was at Ridgeway Hospital. Claudia had received no grades from the Ridgeway School, and
her attendance was irregular due to her frequent need to be confined when she was danger-
ously suicidal. Id. at 15. When confined, however, Claudia was tutored by a teacher provided
by the school district. Id. In addition to this implicit acknowledgment that Claudia was indeed
educable, one of her psychologists testified that Claudia was "certainly educable." Brief for
Appellees at 6, In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
97. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that many difficult questions were involved in a deter-
mination of Claudia's "clear right" to the services which the juvenile court had ordered the
school district to provide. 91 111. 2d at 477, 440 N.E.2d at 81. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that it would "suffice to discuss only the question of the school district's 'clear duty.' " Id.
Thus, the difficult questions were raised but never addressed by the supreme court.
98. The Education Amendments of 1974 were the basis of the current EHA. See Board
of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3044 (1982). These amendments incorporated the major
principles of the right to education cases. See 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 1425, 1432.
The two most prominent cases contributing to the enactment of the EHA, Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
are described in the Act's legislative history as guaranteeing the "right to publicly-supported
education for handicapped children." 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1430. Almost
a decade ago, Congress acknowledged that "it is clear today that this 'right to education' is
no longer in question." Id.
99. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3042 (1982); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(4)
(1976 & Supp. V 1982) (one million handicapped children are excluded entirely from the public
school system). The congressional intent underlying the enactment of the EHA was recognized
in Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1981). The Kruelle
court noted:
The Education Act embodies a strong federal policy to provide an appropriate educa-
tion for every handicapped child. Three interrelated purposes underlay its passage.
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deed, the parties never disputed that the manifest purpose of the EHA was
to provide handicapped children with a free appropriate public education.' 00
Nevertheless, a conflict concerning whether the school district was responsi-
ble for Claudia K.'s education arose because the district drew an arbitrary
distinction between educable and uneducable handicapped children; no such
distinction is expressed in the Act.' 0 '
This arbitrary distinction based on educability refutes the inherent, im-
plicit presumption of the EHA that all children are educable.' 2 The Act
explicitly requires that a free appropriate public education be provided to
all children "regardless of the severity of their handicap."'" 3 Moreover, first
and second funding priorities of the Act insure educational and related ser-
vices to those children currently receiving no services, and to those most
severely handicapped who are receiving inadequate services.' 4 Beyond
establishing a funding priority for those children who are most severely
afflicted, the regulations specifically include schizophrenic children within
the definition of the term "handicapped"; like Claudia, such children are
typically unstable and experience periods of retrogressive or dissociative
behavior.' The explicit provisions of the Act and its implementing regula-
First, Congress sought to secure by legislation the right to a publicly-supported
equal educational opportunity which it perceived to be mandated . . . and explicitly
guaranteed with respect to the handicapped. . . .Second, Congress intended the
provision of education services to increase the personal independence and enhance
the productive capacities of handicapped citizens. Third, Congress acknowleged the
need for an expanded federal fiscal role to aid state compliance with the court
decisions and to assure protection for the rights of handicapped children.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. The manifest purpose of the EHA is to assure that all handicapped children receive
a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet each child's unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1982).
101. See Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981) (the
EHA unqualifiedly requires a free appropriate public education for all handicapped children
"regardless of the severity of their handicap") (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (1978)).
102. See, e.g., Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (the language and legislative history of the EHA simply do not recognize the possibility
that some children may be beyond the reach of educational expertise); Armstrong v. Kline,
476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (by its terms, the EHA appears to demand that the
state supply instruction to handicapped children without limitations), remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980); Matthews v. Campbell, 3 EDUC.
FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 551-264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979) (neither the Act's language
nor its legislative history appears to contemplate the possibility that some children may be un-
trainable); see also Colley, supra note 1, at 144 (concluding that the presumption of educability
under the EHA is irrebuttable); Rothstein, Educational Rights of Severely and Profoundly Handi-
capped Children, 61 NEB. L. REV. 586, 600 (1982) (the EHA's premise is that all children are
educable) [hereinafter cited as Rothstein]. Rothstein believes that Congress should hold com-
mittee hearings to resolve whether certain individuals may be classified as uneducable under
the EHA and, if so, who should make this determination and what criteria should be employed.
103. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(C), 1414(a)(1)(A) (1976).
104. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (1982) (defining first and second priority children).
105. See id. § 300.5(b)(8)(E)(ii) (the classification of seriously emotionally disturbed under
the Act includes children who are schizophrenic); see also supra note 26.
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tions convincingly demonstrate that the EHA was intended to encompass
all handicapped children, especially those with disorders similar to Claudia's.
In cases involving profoundly retarded children whose needs centered more
on custodial care and maintenance than on educational services, courts have
held that such children are beyond the scope of the EHA."' 6 These cases,
however, are rare and their facts are extreme." 7 Most courts have held that
even profoundly retarded,' 8 schizophrenic,0 9 and highly aggressive children' i
106. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46,
52 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (upholding a state statute that excluded from free public schools those
mentally retarded children classified as "incapable of profiting substantially from further in-
struction"); Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dep't, 84 N.J. 234, 250-54, 418 A.2d 229, 239-40
(1980) (profoundly retarded children who fall within the state statutory definition of subtrainable
are not capable of receiving or benefiting from education, and residential care that includes
minimal incidental instruction does not qualify as education for which a school district must
pay). But cf. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (when severely and
profoundly mentally impaired children enter a school system without basic skills such as toilet
training and self-feeding, the educational program must be designed to teach these skills), re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
107. In Levine v. Institution & Agencies Dep't, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980), certain
children were statutorily classified as subtrainable. The applicable New Jersey statute defined
subtrainable children as those who "are so severely mentally retarded as to be incapable of
giving evidence of understanding and responding in a positive manner to simple directions
expressed in the child's primary mode of communication and . . . in some manner express
basic wants and needs." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 46-9(c) (West 1975). Subtrainable children
were further defined as possessing a maximum I.Q. of 24. Id. § 18A: 46-9(b). The two pro-
foundly retarded children in Levine had 1.Q.'s of 1 and 14. 84 N.J. at 239-40, 418 A.2d at
233. If classifying such low-functioning children as uneducable is questionable under the EHA,
it is unfathomable that the school district in Claudia K. could have classified Claudia as
uneducable; Claudia's I.Q. was estimated at 160 and her psychologist described her as being
brilliant. See Chicago Suburban Tribune, Oct. 24, 1981, at 14, col. 1.
108. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981)
(a profoundly retarded adolescent who possessed an I.Q. below 30 and was afflicted with cerebral
palsy was held to be educable); Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 274 (3d Cir. 1980) (plain-
tiff class of the severely and profoundly impaired, either by retardation alone or combined
with other impairments, and with l.Q.'s below 30, was held to be educable); Matthews v. Camp-
bell, 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979) (court ordered
residential placement for a severely retarded child despite grave doubts as to the probable suc-
cess of instruction).
109. See Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D. Tex. 1981)
(a multiple-handicapped child with severe language, learning and behavioral impairments symp-
tomatic of childhood schizophrenia, who was functioning at a pre-kindergarten level, was found
to be educable). After acknowledging that the child's prognosis was extremely doubtful, the
Gladys J. court stated:
Yet there is hope, abundant hope, that with an appropriate education, with specially
designed instruction to meet the unique needs of this severely multiple-handicapped
girl, Laura J. can avoid this dismal prognosis. That hope-indeed, that expectation-
is the very foundation upon which Congress created the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act. The language and legislative history of that Act simply do
not admit of the possibility that some children may be beyond the reach of our
educational expertise. That is the premise upon which this Court's decision is based.
Id. at 879.
110. See Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D. Conn. 1981) (an emotionally
[Vol. 32:483
1983] IN RE CLA UDIA K 507
are educable under the Act. The controversy over educability, arising from
the practical application of the EHA, has focused on whether extremely low-
functioning children, who fit into a classification of trainable or
subtrainable,' may properly be considered educable. Yet, a child such as
Claudia K.-intelligent, verbal, and possessing a history of normal academic
achievement"-is outside the sphere of the trainable/subtrainable issue.
In addition to assuming that the EHA contemplates the possibility that
some children may be uneducable, the school district further assumed that
the Act's system for determining appropriate placement of a child would
serve equally as well as a mechanism to ascertain whether a child was
educable." 3 This system establishes elaborate procedures which require the
state school system to identify, evaluate, and place a child."' To do so,
a multidisciplinary conference is held between parents, teachers, and qualified
representatives of public agencies that ultimately might be responsible for
placement costs."' The express purpose of this conference is to prepare a
child's IEP, a program required by statute to be used as the central manage-
disturbed adolescent with self-destructive behavior, discipline problems and excessive absences
from school was found to be educable); In re "A" Family, - Mont. _ - , 602 P.2d
157, 159 (1979) (a mentally retarded child with uncontrollable, dangerous bouts of retrogressive
behavior was found to be educable).
111. See cases cited supra note 106.
112. Claudia had received all "A's" and "B's" in the ninth grade before quitting school
in the tenth grade. 91 Ill. 2d at 471, 440 N.E.2d at 78.
113. The EHA requires that a multidisciplinary staff conference be held in which the district
must prepare, in conjunction with the child's parents and representatives of other state agen-
cies which might be involved in the placement, an IEP for every child eligible for special education
services. Id. at 473, 440 N.E.2d at 79; see also supra note 34. This system exists for the pur-
pose of evaluating a child's eligibility for special education and related services, and for develop-
ing, reviewing and revising a handicapped child's IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(a) (1982). The
EHA does not contemplate that this system be used to classify a child as educable or uneducable.
The legislative history of the Act reveals that the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare was concerned about the misuse of identification dates, and the procedures and methods
of classifying children as handicapped or not handicapped. 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1425, 1450. In discussing this problem, the committee emphasized the affirmative purposes
for the multidisciplinary conference.
In the educational process, the appropriate identification of handicapping condi-
tions must take place to assure that a child receives appropriate services designed
to meet his or her needs. Such identification must also take place in order that
a State or local educational agency may plan for the provision of appropriate ser-
vices to meet the child's unique needs.
Id. at 1451; see also 34 C.F.R. § 342(b)(2) (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.02 (1979);
Final Draft Policy on IEP's, 2 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 203:2425 (Supp. 60
Nov. 13, 1981). In addition to the Act's legislative history, federal and state regulations ascribe
the following purpose to the system established by the EHA: to identify, evaluate and provide
services for handicapped children. There is nothing in any of these provisions which suggests
that these procedures were designed to exclude a child from receiving services by classifying
him as uneducable.
114. 34 C.F.R. § 300.128 (1982) (identification, location, and evaluation of handicapped
children).
115. See In re Claudia K., 91 Ill. 2d at 473, 440 N.E.2d at 79; see also supra note 34.
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ment tool in providing for and reviewing a child's educational needs. ' 6
The IEP is intended to be a written commitment of the resources necessary
to enable a handicapped child to receive an appropriate education.'" Once
a child is identified as handicapped, an IEP must be developed within thirty
days to insure that there is no undue delay in implementing educational ser-
vices for the child." ' Without a finalized IEP, no special education and
related services may be provided." 9 An examination of these exacting pro-
cedures reveals that the sole purpose and goal of the IEP conference is to
determine an appropriate educational placement for the handicapped child.' 20
There is no basis for concluding that the people involved in developing the
IEP are competent to decide that a child is uneducable and, thus, should
be excluded from educational placement. Yet, the public school personnel
at Claudia's IEP conference determined that she was uneducable and withheld
finalization of her IEP,' 2 ' thereby withholding educational placement and
the provision of any necessary related services. '2
116. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976) (definition of individualized education pro-
gram); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.34-.349 app. C (1982) (explaining the IEP); ILLIN Is PRIMER, supra
note 46, at C-3 (explaining the IEP).
117. See 46 Fed. Reg. 5,460 (1981) (Interpretation of Requirements Under Part B of the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act, As Amended by Pub. L. 94-142) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.340-.349 app. C at 837 (1982)). The legislative history indicates "[ilt is intended that
each handicapped child have an educational program which states . ..goals . . . as well as
. .. instructional objectives." 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1484.
118. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c) (1982). It is expected that a child's IEP will be implemented
"immediately" following the staff meeting. Id. § 300.342 comment. There can be "no undue
delay in providing special education and related services" to a child once that child has been
identified at the conference as handicapped. Id.
119. See generally Rothstein, supra note 102, at 613 (noting that while the procedural
framework established by the EHA for educational placement may be satisfactory for that
single purpose, the process is not necessarily adequate or appropriate to determine that a child
is to be excluded totally from educational placement because the child is "uneducable").
120. Rothstein suggests three potential problem areas which might arise if the placement
process were applied to decisions of educability. These areas focus on: (1) general due process
considerations including the inappropriateness of the Act's procedural safeguards in regard to
educability determinations, the potential costs involved in an educability decision, and the hearing
officer's lack of professional expertise to make such a determination; (2) evidence of uneducability
and the burden of proof; and (3) the need for reevaluation more frequently than the Act pro-
vides when a child is being denied educational services completely. Id. at 612-17.
121. 91 111. 2d at 473, 440 N.E.2d at 79. Claudia's IEP was never finalized at the
multidisciplinary staff conference because the school personnel decided that "suicidal issues"
needed to be settled before she could receive educational services. Id.
122. The unequivocal intention of Congress in outlining these procedures, and of the agen-
cies in promulgating a veritable plethora of regulations to be followed in designing and im-
plementing the IEP, was to guarantee that no handicapped child went without special educa-
tion and services, or even experienced a significant delay in receiving them. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.340-.349 app. C, at 837-56 (1982) (defining and explaining the IEP). Despite this ob-
vious intention and the school district's identification of Claudia as handicapped, the district
refused to finalize Claudia's IEP on the grounds that she was currently uneducable. 91 I11.
2d at 473, 440 N.E.2d at 79.
Under Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), a state satifies the Act's require-
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Even if the Illinois Supreme Court had recognized Claudia as educable
within the contemplation of the EHA, it would not necessarily have found
the school district financially liable for her placement at either Ridgeway
or Riveredge Hospital. Instead, the court would have focused on whether
the school district had demonstrated that Claudia's need for residential place-
ment arose primarily from her noneducational needs.' 2 3 Only upon such a
showing would financial responsibility for placement costs shift from the
school district to an agency with jurisdiction over the noneducational prob-
lem necessitating placement.' 2 If, for example, a child's need for placement
was shown to be exclusively the result of family-related problems, place-
ment costs might shift to the DCFS.' 21 Similarly, if a child's need for residen-
tial placement clearly was attributable to a developmental disability, costs
for placement might shift to the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities.' 26
Although distinguishing between educational and noneducational placements
appears to be simple, the actual task of making such a determination presents
significant difficulties.' 27 It is only in exceptional cases that a child's social,
ment to provide a child with a free appropriate public education by providing personalized
instruction at public expense, under public supervision with sufficient supportive services to
permit the child to benefit from the instruction. Id. at 3049. Such instruction must comport
with the child's IEP, which must be formulated in accordance with the EHA requirements.
Id. By classifying Claudia as uneducable, refusing to finalize her IEP, refusing to provide in-
struction in accordance with a finalized IEP, and refusing to provide supportive services and
instruction at public expense, the school district clearly failed to satisfy the EHA requirements
as interpreted by the Rowley Court and, thus, violated the Act.
123. See supra notes 12, 14 & 15. A court's analysis must focus on whether full-time residential
placement is necessary for educational purposes, or whether it is necessitated by medical, social,
or emotional problems that can be segregated from the learning process. See Kruelle v. New
Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981) (full-time residential placement
is a necessary ingredient to learning when a handicapped child's needs are inseparable, and
in such cases the costs of placement must be assumed by the State Board of Education).
124. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693-94 (when placement is required for emotional problems, either
the child's parents or a social service agency must assume placement costs); see also In re
Richard H., 3 EDUC. FOR Tar HANDICAPPED L. RaP. 502:203 (Ga. SEA DEC. No. 1980-28
Nov. 13, 1980) (placement in hospital for psychiatric reasons was held to be "medical" and,
therefore, outside the school district's financial responsibility); Smith v. Cumberland School
Comm., - R.I. _ -, 415 A.2d 168, 173 (1980) (holding that a school district is not
liable for the costs of a program which is primarily therapeutic when educational services are
only incidental to medical services). See generally Stark, supra note 15,. at 513-16 (citing
administrative decisions in which services were held to address therapeutic needs and placement
was deemed to be other than educational).
125. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 5001-5040 (1981).
126. See id. ch. 911/2, §§ 1-100 to 6-100.
127. See Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 873 (S.D. Tex. 1981)
(noting that the simplicity with which the issue may be defined belies its true complexity because
federal statutes are of recent vintage and decisional law is in a state of flu: as courts struggle
to interpret difficult questions posed by the EHA). See generally Mooney & Aronson, Solomon
Revisited: Separating Educational and Other Than Educational Needs in Special Education
Residential Placements, 14 CONN. L. Rav. 531, 551-56 (1982) (suggesting a new approach to
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emotional, medical, and educational needs can be separated to disclose the
predominant problem necessitating residential placement;128 clear-cut distinc-
tions between educational and noneducational needs rarely exist. As the com-
plexity of a child's handicapping condition increases, the distinction becomes
increasingly blurred.
Despite this problem, the school district in Claudia K. asserted that the
primary cause for Claudia's residential placement was her suicidal mental
condition that the district classified as a decidedly noneducational need.' 29
Because Claudia's placement at both Ridgeway and Riveredge had been
necessitated by a mental problem, the school district maintained that the
placements were primarily noneducational and, accordingly, placement costs
should shift to the DMH. 3 ° Notwithstanding this simplistic argument, the
juvenile court recognized the complexity inherent in determining whether it
was primarily Claudia's educational or noneducational needs that had
necessitated placement.
Upon granting the petition for mandamus, the juvenile court concluded
that a realistic separation between Claudia's educational and noneducational
needs was impossible.'"' Indeed, most courts which have been requested to
make similar distinctions have been unable or unwilling to do so.' 32 Rather,
give meaning to the statutory distinction between 'educational and other than educational
placements under the EHA) [hereinafter cited as Mooney & Aronson].
128. See supra note 123; see also Kenneth B. v. Newton Pub. Schools, 3 EDUC. FOR THE
HANDICAPPED L. REp. 502:348 (Mass. SEA Dec. No. 4584 July 24, 1981) (a handicapped student
needed a 'residential program for psychiatric reasons); Mooney & Aronson, supra note 127,
at 554 (a handicapped student may require treatment in a residential facility for medical reasons
unrelated to the student's educational needs).
129. See In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d at 474, 440 N.E.2d at 80. The school district maintained
that treatment of Claudia's suicidal condition was a medical problem which was beyond its
responsibility.
130. Brief for Appellants at 12, In re Claudia K., 91 Il. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
The school district asserted that the DMH has the responsibility for caring for suicidal people.
Id.; Brief for Appellees at 6, In re Claudia K., 91 ill. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1978).
131. In re Claudia K., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 555:501 (111. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1982).
J32. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1981)
(residential placement held to be necessary for educational reasons for a profoundly retarded
adolescent whose educational and medical needs were inseparable; the inseverability is the very
basis for holding that the services are an essential prerequisite to learning); Gladys J. v. Pearland
Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 876 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that a 15-year-old
suffering from childhood schizophrenia and functioning at a pre-kindergarten level required
residential placement because her social, emotional, medical and educational problems were
so intertwined that it was impossible for the court to separate them); School Dist. No. 4 v.
Frazee, 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 553:259 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 1981) (finding
that the social, emotional, medical and educational problems of a child suffering from cerebral
palsy, greatly impaired motor functions and respiratory disabilities, were unseverable, and that
services provided in a residential program were essential to the child's IEP); Erdman v.
Connecticut, 3 EDIJC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:218 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 1980) (con-
cluding that it was impossible to separate a handicapped child's emotional needs from his academic
needs when planning an educational program that required placement in a residential facility
in order for him to receive an appropriate education); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of
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courts faced with this difficult task uniformly have held that residential place-
ment is within the contemplation of the EHA, and that financial respon-
sibility rests with the educational agency when a child's educational and
noneducational needs are so intertwined as to defy separation.' 33 This posi-
tion was articulated first in North v. District of Columbia Board of
Education.3 ' Employing a bifurcated analysis, the North court held that:
(1) the EHA mandates that a state's educational agency be the central agency
responsible for insuring that each handicapped child receive a free appropriate
public education;' and (2) when it is impossible to separate a child's educa-
tional and noneducational needs, the only legally viable alternative is to en-
force the "clear duty" of the educational agency to provide residential
placement. 3"
Although North clearly establishes that a state educational agency has the
primary responsibility for insuring that all handicapped school-aged children
receive a free appropriate public education, that agency's financial liability
Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979) (residential placement was held to be educational
for a 16 year old multiple-handicapped child who was suffering from epilepsy, emotional distur-
bance and learning disabilities; the court could not perform the "Solomon-like task" of separating
the social, emotional, medical, and educational problems); Matthews v. Campbell, 3 EDUC.
FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979) (holding that a multiple-
handicapped child required residential placement for educational reasons); Ladson v. Board
of Educ., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979) (when
necessary to meet the goals of an IEP, a residential placement is educational for a child with
down's syndrome); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182
Cal. Rptr. 525 (1982) (a handicapped child's emotional problems were held to be so linked
to his learning disability as to justify and require his residential placement for an educational
program); Manchester Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED
L. REP. 552:397 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1981) (residential placement held to be primarily
for special education reasons when a handicapped child's educational program must integrate
her academic, as well as social and emotional needs, to be successful); Wallingford Bd. of
Educ. v. State Bd.. of Educ., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:305 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 6, 1981) (holding that an autistic, mentally retarded child required residential place-
ment for educational purposes); In re "A" Family, - Mont. - , _ 602 P.2d 157,
163 (1979) (holding placement to be educational when a child with severe emotional distur-
bance and suffering from schizophrenia required residential placement and psychotherapy).
133. See supra note 132; see also Mooney & Aronson, supra note 127, at 547-51 (the "Solomon
syndrome").
134. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979), noted in Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist.,
642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Mooney & Aronson, supra note 127, at 547-48
(discussing North as an important case in determining residential placements under the EHA);
Stark, supra note 15, at 514-16 (asserting that North provided a blueprint for subsequent deci-
sions involving the dichotomy between emotional and educational needs in the determination
of residential placement).
135. 471 F. Supp. at 139. The North court noted that the EHA clearly vests the educational
agency with responsibility for administering all educational programs for handicapped children,
and that the educational agency has a clear duty to place a handicapped, school-aged child
in a residential facility when such placement is necessary to provide the child with a free
appropriate public education. Id. at 139-40 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1976)); see also 34
C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982) (residential placement).
136. 471 F. Supp. at 141.
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is not limitless."' Because it is rarely possible to separate a child's educa-
tional and noneducational needs, in almost every case some aspect of a child's
problem, and some component of a residential placement, will be
educational.' 38 Yet, it would be inequitable to classify all residential
placements as educational and assign financial responsibility to the educa-
tional agency. It would be similarly inequitable to classify all placements
as primarily noneducational, thus permitting the educational agency to escape
financial responsibility. Fortunately, neither of these extremes appears to have
been contemplated by the legislators who enacted the EHA.
As emphasized in North and explicitly delineated in the Act, the state
educational agency is the single agency responsible for implementing the
guarantees of the EHA.'" 9 The Act, however, neither requires nor expects
137. The North court acknowledged that when a child's emotional or other medical pro-
blems affect his educational needs, the child's problems should be attended to by social service
agencies rather than by the school authorities. Id. at 140. This acknowledgment suggests that
the court believed that the educational agency, though primarily responsible for assuring place-
ment, should not be singularly responsible for the direct delivery of all services. This issue
was addressed directly in Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.
Tex. 1981). The Gladys J. court noted:
Admittedly, the unequivocal congressional directive to provide an appropriate educa-
tion for all children regardless of the severity of the handicap places a substantial
burden on state and local educational agencies in certain instances. Perhaps this
is one such instance. Regardless of the financial and administrative burdens that
may obtain, however, the Act imposes upon schools the singular obligation to pro-
vide a comprehensive range of services to accommodate a handicapped child's educa-
tional needs, and if necessary, to resort to residential placement.
Id. at 879.
The problem of imposing potentially unlimited financial responsibility on the educational
agency is addressed in Makuch, Year-Round Special Educational and Related Services: A State
Director's Perspective, 47 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 272, 274 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Makuch].
Makuch concludes that the expectation that the educational system will carry the entire burden
of providing all handicapped children with a free appropriate public education will "run [the
educational system] into the ground." Id. He further concludes that the EHA is not an ap-
propriate funding vehicle for guaranteeing a free appropriate public education, and that total
dependence on the educational system will render services unavailable to handicapped children
both prior to and subsequent to school age. See also Colley, supra note 1, at 157-59 (observing
that as state statutes have been passed to bring states into compliance with the EHA, a judicial
trend has emerged which requires all costs of residential placement to be assumed by the local
school district); Stark, supra note 15, at 493 (concluding that the financial impact of residential
placements on school districts under the EHA could be catastrophic); Note, supra note 65,
at 778-82 (discussing the financial realities of educating a handicapped student at a private
residential institution, and noting that until the federal government extends its full proposed
subsidy to the state, both state and local school districts must absorb the cost of increased
services to handicapped students in private facilities).
138. The North court implicitly acknowledged this problem by stating that it was "reluctant
to hold flatly that in every situation where emotional or other medical problems impact upon
educational needs, the normal parens patriae role of the local authorities is displaced by federal
law." 471 F. Supp. at 140.
139. Id. at 139. To prevent abdication of responsibility for educating handicapped children,
Congress designated the SEA as the central point and single line of responsibility and accoun-
tability in implementing the Act's provisions. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 comment (1982).
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the educational agency to deliver directly all necessary services and assume
all costs for placement.1"' The EHA naively presumes that other service
agencies will share responsibility for the provision of services with the state
educational agency, particularly in costly areas such as private residential
placements." '4 Yet, when there is a failure to deliver services, or a violation
of EHA beneficiaries' rights, the educational agency must fulfill its
responsibility' 2 by either forcing another agency to pay for placement or
by assuming placement costs itself.' 3 These other agencies, unlike the educa-
tional agency, are under no federal mandate to provide residential place-
ment necessary for certain handicapped children to receive a free appropriate
140. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 comment (1982). This comment reveals that the EHA does
not equate the designation of the SEA as the responsible agency with the expectation that
the SEA will deliver all services directly. See Makuch, supra note 137, at 273 (the EHA
and its implementing regulations suggest that the state educational agency is not required to
provide all services directly, but rather is responsible for insuring that services ultimately are
provided).
141. See Makuch, supra note 137, at 273; see also SRI INTERNATIONAL, EDUCATION AND
HumAN SERvICEs RESEARCH CENTER, LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF P.L. 94-142: TmIRD YEAR REPORT
OF A LONGITUDINAL STUDY 18 (1981) (three year study including two special education districts
in Illinois concludes that two issues which remain problematic at the local level are the provi-
sion of mental health services, and interagency coordination for providing related services under
the EHA) [hereinafter cited as SRI REPORT]. A recent example of the mistaken presumption
of interagency cooperation in providing services required by the EHA is William S. v. Gill,
536 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In that case, a handicapped child brought a class action
against the local school district to force it to pay the costs of certain related services which
the school district insisted were noneducational and, consequently, refused to fund. The named
defendants, a number of state and local educational officials and entities, filed a cross-claim
against the State Board of Education and a third party claim against the Department of Public
Aid, DMHDD, the Bureau of the Budget, DCFS, the Department of Public Health and the
Review Board. Id. at 507. The third party claim was based on the named defendants' conten-
tion that these other agencies failed to fulfill the agreement reached under the Memorandum
of Understanding. Id. at 514; see also supra note 34 (discussion of the Memorandum of
Understanding); cf. North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (noting
that it is unfortunate that the two agencies responsible for the plaintiffs' care were seeking
to shift the responsibility to each other; the Board of Education claimed that the plaintiffs'
problems were emotional, while the Department of Human Resources asserted that they were
educational).
142. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 comment (1982) (the SEA is responsible for the failure to
deliver services or the violation of rights of handicapped children under the EHA).
143. See, e.g., William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. 111. 1982) (state and local educa-
tional entities filed a cross-claim against the State Board of Education, and a third party claim
against five state agencies and the Review Board, for costs of related services provided to a
class of handicapped children). The Illinois School Code specifically provides that if a child
has been placed in an approved residential program, room and board costs shall be paid by
the appropriate state agency. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1981). Room and board costs
which are not provided by another state agency shall be provided by the State Board of Educa-
tion. Id. § 14-8.01. Section 14-8.01 further provides that special education and related services
included in a child's IEP, which are not provided by another state agency, shall be provided
by the State Board of Education and the local school district. Id.; see also P. PIELE, THE
YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL LAW 133-42 (1981) (discussing cases that involved disputes arising from
the allocation of financial liability for the provision of services under the EHA).
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public education.' 4 4 The unfortunate results of this unilateral mandate, as
poignantly illustrated by Claudia K., are the following: (1) a trend toward
requiring educational agencies to bear all costs of residential placements;' 4 5
(2) a lack of integration of the various agencies' services to handicapped
children;' 4 6 (3) a considerable amount of interagency buck-passing and
conflict;'' and (4) a failure to provide handicapped children with a free
appropriate public education. '4"
144. See Makuch, supra note 139, at 274. Makuch concludes that the only agency that can
be held accountable, if services are not provided, is the SEA. Other human service agencies
are under no universal obligation to provide services to handicapped people. But see Parks
v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 110 Ill. App. 3d 184, 441
N.E.2d 1209 (1st Dist. 1982). The defendant in Parks, DMHDD, appealed from a finding that
a relative liability charge, assessed against the parents of a handicapped child for residential
placement, violated the EHA. DMHDD contended that under the Act only the SEA is authorized
to educate handicapped children and, therefore, the plaintiffs must obtain relief exclusively
from the educational agency. The court disagreed and quoted from a federal regulation that
provided:
"[The provisions of this part apply] to all political subdivisions of the State that
are involved in the education of handicapped children. These would include:
"(1) The State educational agency,
"(2) local educational agencies . . .
"(3) other State agencies and schools (such as Departments [of/ Mental Health and
Welfare.
110 I11. App. 3d at 188, 441 N.E.2d at 1212 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b) (1981)) (emphasis
in case). The court noted that it could not be asserted seriously that DMHDD is not "involved
in the education of handicapped children," and concluded that the EHA is binding on DMHDD.
A federal regulation supports this conclusion by providing that "the requirements of this part
are binding on each public agency that has direct or delegated authority to provide special
education and related services in a State that receives funds under Part B of the Act, regardless
of whether that agency is receiving funds .. " 34 C.F.R. § 300(2) comment (1982).
145. See supra notes 11 & 132; see also Colley, supra note 1, at 158.
146. See SRI REPORT, supra note 141.
147. See, e.g., William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 513 (N.D. I11. 1982) (a local school
district and a special education district filed a cross-claim against the State Board of Educa-
tion, refusing to pay for noneducational placements under the EHA, because state education
officials and the State Board had threatened not to reimburse them for funding); North v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136,,141 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that it was
unfortunate that the court's assistance had to be invoked under federal statutes to resolve what
essentially were internal bureau disputes); In re Claudia K., 91 111. 2d 469, 475, 441 N.E.2d
78, 80 (1982) (a school district maintained that it had responsibility to provide medical services
only for diagnostic and evaluative purposes, and that psychotherapeutic treatment of the plain-
tiff's suicidal condition was beyond its responsibility); Parks v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities, 110 I11. App. 3d 184, 186, 441 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (1st Dist.
1982) (DMHDD argued that only the State Board of Education is authorized to educate han-
dicapped children and, therefore, parents of handicapped children may seek reimbursement
for costs of residential placement only from the State Board of Education); see also Letter
of Finding from Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to Rockford School Dist. (Oct. 20, 1980) (noting
an obvious deficiency in efforts of Illinois state agencies to coordinate educational programs
for handicapped children), reprinted in 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 257:173-74
(Supp. 38 Dec. 12, 1980)
148. See Letter of Finding from OCR to Illinois Governor's Purchased Care Review Board
(Feb. 27, 1980) (identifying a major problem in Illinois regarding the provision of a free ap-
[Vol. 32:483
1983] IN RE CLA UDIA K. 515
Interagency cooperation will be unattainable unless each human service
agency is legally obligated to perform its respective role.' 9 Despite current
efforts in Illinois to encourage interagency cooperation in providing residen-
tial placements for handicapped children,'5I conflicts over which agency must
assume placement costs persist among mental health, social service, and
educational agencies.'' The absence of any controlling standards for classify-
ing a residential placement as educational or noneducational is exploited by
these various agencies as a means of escaping financial responsibility.' 2 It
propriate public education to handicapped children requiring residential care), reprinted in 2
EDUC. FOR TM HANDICAPPED L. REP. 257:82 (Supp. 22 April 18, 1980). OCR concluded that
the Illinois Board of Education failed to provide a free appropriate public education to a sizeable
class of handicapped children. The letter provided the following outline of the problems revealed
by OCR's investigation:
I. Handicapped children are being denied a free appropriate public education:
B. Insufficient residential free appropriate public education facilities exist to meet
the needs of Illinois handicapped children;
C. Complexity of rate review system contributes to problems associated with the
provision of free appropriate public education;
D. Great numbers of handicapped children are placed in residential facilities out-
side of Illinois.
E. Parents pay part/total costs of appropriate residential facilities:
1. Parents pay difference between actual costs and GPCRB [Review Board]-
approved costs;
2. Handicapped children are removed from appropriate residential facilities
when insurance coverage is depleted and actual costs exceed GPCRB-approved
costs;
3. Parents are urged by ISBE [Illinois State Board of Education], GPCRB
and LEAs to apply for Individual Care Grants; parents receiving these grants,
are liable for monthly, sliding-scale contribution cost;
F.' Section 504 Violations.
II. Procedural safeguards are unavailable for issues relating to financial
responsibility:
A. GPCRB-approved costs are not subject to due process review;
B. ISBE considers costs paid by parents to other state agencies assisting in the
payment of free appropriate public education inappropriate for procedural
review.
Id.
149. See Makuch, supra note 137, at 274 (all human service agencies must be equally
accountable and responsible for providing services, and required to combine their resources).
150. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 34. See generally ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.
127, § 742(1) (1981) (authorizing state and local governing bodies to cooperate in the perfor-
mance of their respective responsibilities).
151. See ILLINOIS ST. BD. OF EDUC., DEP'T OF SPECIALIZED EDUC. SERV. MGMT. BULL. 13
(Winter/March 1981) (finding that Illinois lacks a comprehensive design for administering physical
and mental health, juvenile justice, and child welfare services to identified special education
students).
132. See, e.g., William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 509 (N.D. Il1. 1982). In that case,
the parents of a handicapped child contended that in light of a statewide policy of dividing
children into educational and noneducational components, it was fruitless to pursue an ad-
ministrative remedy; the parents claimed that this policy prevented their children from receiv-
ing the most appropriate and beneficial placements. The parents also asserted that by refusing
to fund noneducational components of a residential placement, the SEA and the school district
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is imperative that the state legislature devise a method by which costs for
residential placement can be apportioned on an equitable basis among the
respective service agencies. By failing to articulate a position or request the
legislature to act, the Illinois Supreme Court declined an opportunity to
remedy this residential placement issue. The court could have remanded
Claudia K. with instructions that placement costs for Claudia's care and
treatment at Ridgeway and Riveredge be apportioned among the various
agencies, including the school district, the DMH and the DCFS. As a result
of the court's failure to order such cost apportionment, the educa-
tional/noneducational placement controversy will continue to exist.' 3
PSYCHOTHERAPY AS A RELATED SERVICE
Once a placement has been determined to be educational, the remaining
problem is in deciding which agency is responsible for the costs of the various
services a handicapped child receives while residing in the placement. The
juvenile court found that Claudia's placement at both private residential
hospitals was necessary to provide her with a free appropriate public
education."' Under the EHA, this finding requires that the residential pro-
gram, including room, board, and nonmedical care, be provided at no cost
to the child's parents or guardian. " ' The obligation placed on the educa-
tional agency by the EHA, however, is not limited to paying the costs of
room, board and nonmedical care. Under the Act, the educational agency
also must provide each handicapped child with a free appropriate public
education which consists of special education and related services.' The
EHA, in addition to enumerating certain specific related services, " generally
forced them to seek recourse with other state agencies which either would not or could not
provide funding; consequently, their handicapped child was denied a free appropriate public
education. Id.; cf. In re Special Educ. Placement of Steven Walker, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1053,
438 N.E.2d 582 (lst Dist. 1982) (the Illinois State Board of Education and a school district
denied that a handicapped student's need for residential placement was necessitated by educa-
tional needs).
153. Some states have devised such cost apportionment methods under which the educa-
tional agency pays for the educational component in a noneducational residential placement,
while the other service agencies fund the placement's noneducational components. See, e.g.,
Curtis H. v. Boston Public Schools, 2 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 502:240 (Mass.
SEA Dec. No. 4109 Feb. 20, 1981) (under the authority of an interagency agreement, the Depart-
ment of Youth Services and the LEA were each responsible for 50%0 of the costs of a handi-
capped child's residential program).
154. In re Claudia K., 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 552:501 (I11. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1981) (order granting a petition for mandamus and finding that psychotherapy is a related
service).
155. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(B), 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (implemented by
34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982)); see also supra note 12 (discussion of the implementing regulation).
156. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16)-(17) (1976) (implemented by 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13-.14 (1982));
see also supra note 8 (discussion of implementing regulation).
157. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); see also supra note 8 (discussing § 1401(17)). The
regulations explicitly state that the list of enumerated related services is not exhaustive, and
may include other supportive services if such services are required to assist a handicapped child
in benefiting from special education. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.14 comment (1982). The regulations
also clearly indicate that all related services may not be required for every child. Id.
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defines related services as those supportive services "required to assist a handi-
capped child to benefit from special education.""15 Thus, under the Act,
the school district in Claudia K. could be held financially responsible not
only for the costs of nonmedical care, room, and board,"5 9 but also for the
costs of any related service provided to Claudia at the residential placement.
Consequently, after determining that Claudia's placements were educational,
the juvenile court was obligated to determine whether the treatment Claudia
received could be classified as either nonmedical care or related services' 60
within the purview of the EHA and its implementing regulations. This deter-
mination required the court to address one of the most frequently raised
and controversial issues of compliance with the EHA: whether psychotherapy
is a related service.' 6' Finding that psychotherapy was a related service under
both federal and state law, the juvenile court ordered the school district to
assume costs for the psychotherapy Claudia received at Ridgeway and
Riveredge Hospital.' 62 Subsequently, the Illinois State Board of Education
cautioned the supreme court that affirmance of this lower court finding would
lead to the eventual bankruptcy of the state school system.' 63 Despite the
significant ramifications which might have resulted from a finding that
psychotherapy is a related service under the EHA, the Illinois Supreme Court
never reached this important issue.'""
The controversy over whether psychotherapy constitutes a related service
originates from ambiguities in the Act's definitions of related services.' 65 While
"psychotherapy" per se is not among the services enumerated in the EHA,
it conceivably could be within the ambit of psychological, counseling, or
medical services, all of which are designated as related services.' 66 As defined
158. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
159. Under the residential placement provision of the EHA, the educational agency is respon-
sible for the costs of nonmedical care. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982). Similarly, under the free
appropriate public education provision, the educational agency is liable for the costs of related
services. Id. § 300.4. This provision further requires that related services be provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge. /d. § 300.4(a).
160. See supra note 159.
161. For a discussion of this issue, see Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at AC 15-45; Stark, supra
note 15, at 516-24; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 8, at 17-21.
162. In re Claudia K., 3 EDuc. FOR THE HANDCAPPT L. REP. 552:501 (111. Cir. Ct. July
31, 1981) (order granting petition for mandamus and directing school district to assume costs
for residential placement and psychotherapy).
163. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Illinois State Board of Education at 24, In re Claudia
K., 91 Il. 2d 469, 440 N.E.2d 78 (1982).
164. The dispositive issue in Claudia K. was whether the juvenile court properly granted
the writ of mandamus against the school district. See supra notes 57-70.
165. The EHA merely lists examples of related services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
Furthermore, the implementing regulations define only those related services which are enumerated
in the Act. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1982).
166. Although psychotherapy is not among those services enumerated under the Act's related
services provision, the terms "psychological services," "medical services," and "counseling ser-
vices" are listed in the statutory provision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976). Moreover, the
implementing regulations specifically define these terms. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(2) (counsel-
ing services), (4) (medical services), (8) (psychological services) (1982).
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by the Act's implementing regulations, the term "psychological services"
refers to various procedures used to obtain psychological information from
a child in order to develop the child's IEP.'6 7 These procedures include
administering tests, interpreting test results, and consulting with the
multidisciplinary team in planning the IEP.'" The final product of such
psychological services may be "planning and managing a program of
psychological services," including "psychological counseling for children and
parents."' 69 Thus, while this provision refers to psychological counseling,
it only obligates the educational agency to plan and manage psychological
counseling, not to provide it. Moreover, the term "psychological counsel-
ing" is neither designated as a related service nor defined within the Act
or its implementing regulations.
Counseling services are defined by federal regulations as services provided
by qualified personnel including social workers and psychologists.' 70 Although
counseling services appear to encompass psychotherapy, there are two
obstacles to reaching this conclusion. First, if psychotherapy is provided by
a licensed physician, such as a psychiatrist, it may be categorized as a medical
service '' rather than a counseling service and, therefore, fall outside the
scope of related services. Second, because psychotherapy has been widely
identified as a medical service, it is arguable that if Congress had intended
167. The regulations define the term "psychological services" to include the following:
(i) Administering psychological and educational tests, and other assessment
procedures;
(ii) Interpreting assessment results;
(iii) Obtaining, integrating, and interpreting information about child behavior and
conditions relating to learning.
(iv) Consulting with other staff members in planning school programs to meet the
special needs of children as indicated by psychological tests, interviews, and
behavioral evaluations; and
(v) Planning and managing a program of psychological services, including
psychological counseling for children and parents.
34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(8)(i)-(v) (1982) (emphasis added). These regulations clearly emphasize
the gathering of psychological information from and about the child in order to plan and manage
a program of psychological counseling. Nevertheless, they completely fail to assign responsibili-
ty for the provision of such a program.
168. See id.
169. Id. § 300.14(b)(8)(v).
170. Id. § 300.14(b)(2). The regulations specifically designate services provided by "qualified
social workers, psychologists, guidance counselors, or other qualified personnel" as counseling
services. Id.
171. Medical services are distinguished from counseling services, in part, by the identity of
the service provider. The regulations suggest that when a service is provided by a licensed physi-
cian, that service will not be classified as a counseling service; only nonmedical personnel can
deliver counseling services. Id. Yet, under the regulations, not all services provided by a physi-
cian qualify as medical services. The definition of medical services focuses on both the identity
of the service provider, a licensed physician, and the purpose of the service: "to determine
a child's medically related handicapping condition which results in the child's need for special
education and related services." Id. § 300.13(b)(4). This definition is consistent with the Act's
limitation that medical services "shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
IN RE CLAUDIA K.
to include psychotherapy under counseling services, it would have clearly
indicated such an intent;' 2 by failing to do so, Congress indicated that
psychotherapy was not intended to be included as a counseling service. Both
arguments have been raised by school districts attempting to escape the costs
of psychotherapy administered to handicapped students in residential
programs.'73
Finally, under the EHA, medical services are confined to those services
provided by a licensed physician, and limited to the purpose of diagnosis
and evaluation."' Consequently, psychotherapy, which by definition is
therapeutic rather than diagnostic, could not be considered a medical
service.' 75 Furthermore, if psychotherapy is provided by a licensed physician
in a residential program, it is "medical" and, therefore, beyond the obliga-
tions imposed on the educational agency under the Act's residential place-
ment provision which includes only room, board, and nonmedical care. 76
A finding that psychotherapy does not fit comfortably under any of these
provisions seems to contravene Congress's intent in enacting the EHA: to
provide all handicapped children with a free appropriate public education.' 7
Because all of the alternatives offered by the Act's provisions are problematic,
it is necessary to look beyond the statute and to consider its various inter-
pretations. One such interpretation was offered by the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), one of the federal regulatory agencies responsible for overseeing the
EHA's implementation."' As early as 1979, OCR determined that
psychotherapy was a psychological service and, therefore, a related service
if its provision was necessary to enable a child to benefit from special
education. 79 Subsequent OCR letters of finding have affirmed this position
172. See Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at AC 41-42.
173. See, e.g., Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn. 1981) (the defen-
dants argued that psychotherapy was not a related service because the definition of such ser-
vices excludes medical services that are not diagnostic or evaluative); In re "A" Family, -
Mont. -, -, 602 P.2d 157, 165 (1979) (a school district asserted that psychotherapy was
not a related cost in a severely emotionally disturbed child's residential placement).
174. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) (implemented by 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4) (1982)).
175. See, e.g., Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn. 1981). The Papacoda
court dismissed this argument as inconsistent with both the plain meaning of the EHA and
the only case that had considered the issue. Id. Additionally, the court held that psychological
services which are required to assist a handicapped child in benefiting from special education
are not embraced within the excepted medical services; rather, they are related services which
must be provided at no cost to the parents. Id. at 72 (citing In re "A" Family, __ Mont.
.. . 602 P.2d 157, 165 (1979)).
176. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1982).
177. See supra note 1.
178. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has stated its position on psychotherapy clearly and
consistently in letters of finding. In Claudia K., the Illinois Supreme Court referred to the
OCR letters as "letters of finding by a federal oversight agency which indicated that state
regulations were not in compliance with federal guidelines." 91 111. 2d 469, 477, 440 N.E.2d
78, 81 (1982); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 20 at AC 21 (declaring that OCR generally has
concluded that the cost of psychological services must be assumed by the educational agency).
179. See, e.g., Letter from Office of Civil Rights to Connecticut Commissioner of Educa-
tion (Oct. 17, 1979); Letter from Office of Civil Rights to Berkeley Unified School District
(July 26, 1979).
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and have stipulated further that the educational agency's failure to provide
a child with necessary psychotherapeutic services violates the EHA.18 °
In Illinois, both state and federal courts have considered the psychotherapy
issue. In Gary B. v. Cronin,' 8 ' the plaintiffs, emotionally disturbed children,
had to attend private residential schools because the Illinois public schools
did not have appropriate special education facilities in which to place them.
Injunctive relief was sought with respect to a rule, adopted by the Gover-
nor's Purchased Care Review Board, that excluded counseling and therapeutic
services from being labeled related services to be provided at public expense.'82
The defendant, State Superintendant of Education, contended that any
psychotherapy which might benefit the plaintiffs was related to their mental
health, not to their educational needs.' 83 The federal district court disagreed,
holding that while psychotherapy may be related to mental health, it also
may be required before a child can derive any benefit from education.' 84
The court concluded that the Act's legislative history made it abundantly
clear that if psychotherapy is part of a program at a residential placement
recommended by the school district, it should be provided at public expense.' 85
Gary B. is consistent with other decisions rejecting the argument that
psychotherapy is always a medical service.' 86 Moreover, in In re Special
Education Placement of Steven Walker,'87 the Illinois Court of Appeals for
the First District disagreed with the defendants' assertion that psychotherapy
received by a severely emotionally disturbed student in a residential school
180. In a letter of finding issued to the Review Board in February 1980, OCR found that
the state's refusal to finance counseling and therapeutic services violated the EHA. OCR con-
cluded that there is a legal duty to provide psychiatric services when they are appropriate.
See Letter from Office of Civil Rights to Illinois Governor's Purchased Care Review Board
(Apr. 18, 1980); see also Letter from Office of Civil Rights to Rockford School District (Oct.
20, 1980) (failure to provide a child with psychotherapeutic services violates the EHA), reprinted
in 3 EDUC. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 257:173 (Supp. 38 Dec. 12, 1980); Letter from
Office of Civil Rights to Simsbury Public Schools (June 16, 1980) (same), reprinted in 3 EDUC.
FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP. 257:176 (Supp. 38 Dec. 12, 1980).
181. 542 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. 11. 1982).
182. Id. at 106. The complaint in Gary B. alleged that Review Board Rule 3.21(c) excluded
counseling and therapeutic services from being considered special education or related services
which the state must provide, and that failure to provide these services violated both the EHA,
by depriving the plaintiffs of a free appropriate public education, and the Illinois School Code.
Id.; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14.1 to .01 (1977); Governor's Purchased Care Review
Board Rule 3.21(c), reprinted in 3 Ill. Reg. 211, 212 (Oct. 19, 1979).
183. 542 F. Supp. at 117.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn. 1981) (psychotherapy
is not embraced within the exception to medical services; rather, it is a psychological service);
In re "A" Family, - Mont. , -, 602 P.2d 157, 165 (1979) (psychotherapy is not
regarded as a medical service for the purpose of determining related costs; rather, it is within
the scope of psychological services which are related costs).
187. 107 111. App. 3d 1053, 438 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1982).
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could not have been a related service within the meaning of the state rules
and regulations.' 8 The court held that the school's integrated treatment pro-
gram, which consisted of specially designed instruction and supplemental ser-
vices, including psychotherapy, fell within the EHA's definition of special
education and related services.' 89
In Claudia K., the school district articulated the following arguments: (1)
Claudia was uneducable; (2) placement at a private residential psychiatric
hospital was noneducational; and (3) because Claudia was incapable of
benefiting from education and her placement was primarily noneducational,
psychotherapy was not a related service. It is beyond dispute that Claudia
was a handicapped child and, due to her actively suicidal condition, no ap-
propriate, approved residential facility in Illinois would accept her for long-
term placement. As a result, Claudia was receiving instruction at both
Ridgeway and Riveredge Hospital; to benefit from such instruction, she re-
quired psychotherapy. Clearly, in Claudia's case, psychotherapy constituted
a related service under the EHA.
To prevent the deleterious financial impact on the school system which
might have resulted from a holding that psychotherapy is a related service,
the Illinois Supreme Court could have: (1) limited its holding to the unique
facts of the case; and (2) reversed and remanded the cause with instructions
to apportion the costs of Claudia's psychotherapy among the school district
and the other social service agencies. 9 ° Nevertheless, by disregarding this
readily available opportunity to resolve the psychotherapy issue, the court
failed both to provide any guidance for resolution of this issue, and to exert
its judicial influence to prompt legislative or administrative action. This failure
permits educational as well as other public agencies to continue exploiting
the ambiguities of the Act's related services provisions in their attempts to
escape responsibility for the provision of psychotherapy to students such as
Claudia K.
188. Id. at 1060, 438 N.E.2d at 587. The defendants in Walker contended that because the
plaintiff received only mainstream instruction, rather than special education, the psychological
support or psychotherapy he received at the residential program was not a related service under
Rule 1.08a. That rule provides that related services include supportive services which are re-
quired to assist a handicapped child in benefiting from special education. Rules and Regula-
tions to Govern the Administration and Operation of Special Education, art. 1, Rule 1.08a,
6 11. Admin. Reg. 559-60 (Jan. 8, 1982). Such services include psychological services, counsel-
ing services, and medical services for diagnostic or evaluative purposes. Id. Thus, the Illinois
definition of the term "related services," patterned after the EHA definition, lends itself to
the same interpretative pitfalls. See supra note 8.
189. 107 Il. App. 3d at 1061, 438 N.E.2d at 588.
190. See, e.g., Curtis H. v. Boston Pub. Schools, 3 EDuc. FOR THE HANDICAPPED L. REP.
502:240 (Mass. SEA Dec. No. 4109 Feb. 20, 1981) (under the authority of an interagency agree-
ment, the Department of Youth Services and the LEA were each responsible for 50% of the
costs of a residential program which included counseling and psychotherapy).
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CONCLUSION
Under the Education of the Handicapped Act, the primary responsibility
for insuring that all handicapped, school-aged children receive a free ap-
propriate public education lies squarely with the state educational agency.
This mandate has placed a potentially insurmountable practical and finan-
cial burden on the state school system. To alleviate this burden, the educa-
tional agency has attempted to shift the costs of residential placements to
other service agencies by classifying such placements as noneducational, and
insisting that the care and treatment provided in the residential program,
particularly psychotherapy, is not a related service under the EHA.
Interagency cooperation in the provision of residential placements for
handicapped children will be unattainable unless each human service agency
is legally obligated to assume its equitable portion of placement costs. While
any legal obligation should be instituted by the state legislature, it is the
state judiciary's enforcement of the Act's provisions which could prompt
this legislative action. In re Claudia K. provided the Illinois Supreme Court
with an opportunity to address several difficult issues arising from local im-
plementation of the EHA. A decision on the merits might have motivated
the state legislature to act, if only in response to pressure exerted on it by
the agencies that could have been held liable for the costs of Claudia's care
and treatment. It is incumbent upon the Illinois Supreme Court to resolve
the intrinsic ambiguities in the EHA's language, and to articulate a stan-
dard for apportioning costs among various service agencies. Only if such
action is taken can Illinois fulfill its federal obligation to provide all handi-
capped children with a free appropriate public education.
Cynthia N. Sarno
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